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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses the role moral arguments have played, and continue to 
play, in patent law. The historical development and basts of this exclusion 
is investigated. International developments in the area, such as the 
proposed European draft Directive on Biotechnology, are discussed. In 
particular attention is focused on the areas of DNA, gene and transgenic 
animal patents, and methods of medical treatment, including the emerging 
area of gene therapy. The divergent responses of the United States and the 
European Union to biotechnology inventions are explored. 
In the light of this analysis proposed reforms to New Zealand's patent laws 
are discussed. It is argued that moral arguments have a valuable role to 
play in patent law. With the emergence of the biotechnology industry this 
role is perhaps now more important than ever before. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 19,000 words. 
1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Do moral arguments have a legitimate role to play in patent law? This 
paper attempts to answer this question with a view to extracting principles 
which can be used to guide patent law reform in New Zealand. Included 
within the phrase "moral arguments" are arguments which refer to 
morality, ethics1 and human dignity. The emergence of new technologies, 
such as biotechnology, has brought this question to the fore. 
It will be argued that moral considerations do have a legitimate role to play 
in patent law. It is a mistake to argue, as opponents of morality provisions 
sometimes do, that the patent system is designed to encourage innovation 
per se, as a good in its own right. The patent system is meant to 
encourage innovation in the short term with a view to serving the long 
term public good. 
A morality clause in patent law can be used to advance the public good in 
a number of ways. It can be used to encourage behaviour considered to be 
socially desirable (for example the autonomy of physicians); to discourage 
outcomes con,;idered to be socially undesirable (for example the suffering 
of animals); and to make a statement about society's values (for example 
that it is contrary to human dignity for somebody to hold a commercial2 
2 
Ethics has been defined as the "science of morals in human 
conduct": The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (8 
ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990). 
The common law has been reluctant to recognise a property right 
in a dead human body, however it has recognised a right to 
possession of a dead body: P Skegg "The Interpretation of the 
Human Tissue Act 1961" (1976) 16 Med Sci Law 193; R v Fox 
(1841) 2 QB 246; Williamsv Williams (1881) 20 C'h D 659. 
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property right in parts of the human body).3 It can be argued that these 
diverse aims are all in the public good and each is a legitimate aim of 
patent law. Equally it can be argued that some of these social goals are 
best achieved by laws directed specifically at the hann contemplated, such 
as laws to protect animal welfare, and that the patent system is not the 
appropriate place to address moral and social concerns. 
If it is accepted that moral arguments do have a place in patent law, then 
the question has to be asked how much weight do they cany? For 
example few people deny the validity of the ethical arguments against the 
patenting of methods of medical treatment. However, proponents of such 
patents argue that their value in encouraging the development of new 
methods of medical treatment outweighs their detrimental ethical impact. 
For centunes morality clauses have been a common feature of patent laws. 
These provisions have been used infrequently, and have attracted little 
interest from law refonners. However, in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the advent of new technologies has put the focus on the morality 
ground for patent refusal. Some countries, such as the US, have 
responded by excluding moral considerations from the decision whether or 
not to grant a patent, while others, such as those of the European Union, 
have retained a morality exclusion. It will be argued here that the 
European approach, despite its difficulties, is to be preferred. The patent 
3 Determining what society's values are in the latter half of the 
twentieth centwy is a dt:fficult task. In New Zealand this will 
involve taking account of diverse cultures, mcluding the 'Western' 
culture and the framework of Judaeo-Christian beliefs, and Maori 
culture. The 'ethic of care' propounded by the Canadian Royal 
Commission (see Part VI B below) may provide some guidance, 
in partlcular they say that "moral reasoning involves trying to find 
creative solutions that can remove conflict, rather than simply 
subordinating one person's interests to another." 
3 
system must not be allowed to operate as if it existed in a vacuum, isolated 
from other human values. 
II THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS1RY 
Biotechnology has been broadly defined as "any technique that uses living 
organisms ( or parts of organisms) to make or modify products, to improve 
plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific use". 4 Recent 
developments in biotechnology have focused on the understanding and 
manipulation of the hereditary units of life. World-wide there are over 
1,300 biotechnology companies with a combined annual turnover of 
US$8.1 billion, 5 and sales of biotechnology-derived products may exceed 
US$100 billion by the year 2000.6 Patent protection is critical for 
biotechnology inventions which often involve high development costs but 
are easily copied. 
Biotechnology patents may encompass living organisms, components of 
living organisms, including components of human beings, and methods for 
the medical treatment of human bemgs. Biotechnology patents raise 
ethical and moral issues. This paper will focus on three areas of 
biotechnology inventions, namely inventions relating to human 
DNNgenes, transgenic animals and methods of medical treatment of 
human beings. 
4 
6 
------------
Biotechnology for the 21st Century (FCCSETT Committee on 
J,ife Sciences and Health (Government Printing Office, 
Washington DC, 1993) 3. 
C' Roberts "The Prospects of Success of the National Institute of 
Health's Human Genome Application" [1994] 1 EIPR 30. 
MS Greenfield "Recombmant DNA fechnology: A Science 
Struggling with Patent Law" (1992) 44 Stanford Law Review 
1051. 
4 
III SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND 
A Jntroducti.on 
In the 1950s Watson and Crick worked out the structure of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the basic hereditary material of human 
beings.7 DNA and Ribonucleic acid (RNA) have since been found to be 
responsible for carrying the hereditary material of all life on Earth. In the 
40 years since Watson and Crick described the structure of DNA 
advances m genetic technology have spawned the development of the 
biotechnology industry. The biotechnology mdustry is applying DNA 
technology to produce new products and processes, including medicines 
and methods of medical treatment. 
B Genes and DNA 
DNA is made up of constituent "nucleotide bases" which form a specific 
sequence, coding for8 specific proteins. The DNA molecules are long and 
occur as a part of chromosomes. In humans there are 23 pairs of 
chromosomes, containing in total approximately l 00, OOO genes which are 
collectively referred to as the human genome. A gene is the length of 
DNA which codes for a particular protein. As a part of the Human 
Genome Project, scienttstc;i from around the world are currently attempting 
to sequence and identify the function of all human genes. 9 This project 
should be completed within the next decade. 
7 
8 
9 
J D Watson The Double Helix- a personal account of the 
discovery of the structure of DNA (Hannondsworth-Penguin, 
London, 1970). 
That is, containing the information necessary to instruct the 
cellular machinery how to construct a protein. 
R Eisenberg "Patenting the Human Genome" (1990) 39 Emory 
Law Journal 721 
5 
The cells of the body can be divided into two categories, somatic cells and 
germ cells. The germ cells give rise to the sperm and ovum ( egg), and are 
located in the testes and ovaries respectively. The remaining cells of the 
body arc the somatic cells, and do not contribute DNA to the next 
generation. 
C Transgenic Animals 
It is now possible to take a gene from one animal (for example a human 
bemg) and to msert that gene into another animal ( a sheep for example). 
The resulting animal is a so-called "transgenic" animal. 10 Transgenic 
animals have many potential uses including the production of medicines, 11 
as research tools, 12 or as farm animals. 
D 1.lfethods of Medi.ea/, Treatment 
Biotechnology will result in the development of new methods of medical 
treatment, 13 such as gene therapy. Possibly as many as 1 in 3 people are 
affected by a genetic or part-genetic disease during their lifetime. 14 There 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
--~----
For example the transgenic mouse protected by US Patent 
Number 4,736,866. 
The transgenic sheep "Tracey" produced by Bayer/Pharmaceutical 
Proteins produces alpha-I-anti-trypsin in its milk: M Paver "A tale 
of two rodents, or a rodent with two tails: Europe grapples with 
patenting animals" Patent World, June 1993. 
The transgenic animal of US Patent Number 4,736 866 is intended 
for use as a research tool. 
By the phrase "methods of medical treatment" is meant the use in 
practice by physicians, or otherwise, of procedures to prevent, 
cure or alleviate human suffering or illness. This procedure may 
involve the administration of a drug, the use of a device or the 
performance of a sequence of steps. The drug or device per se 
does not constitute a method of medical treatment. 
Our Genetzc Future-The Science and Ethics of Genetic 
Technology British Medical Association (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1992) l. 
6 
are approximately 4,000 recogmsed monogenic (ie caused by a single 
defective gene) genetic diseases in humans. Cystic fibrosis is an example 
of a monogcnic disorder in which the responsible gene has been identified. 
Many other diseases are multifactorial, 15 that is they are caused by the 
interaction of more than one gene (polygenic) and/or environmental 
factors. 
Human gene therapy has been defmed as "the deliberate administration of 
genetic material into a human patient with the intent of correcting a 
specific defect". 16 Gene therapy is a form of genetic engineering. Clinical 
trials of somatic cell gene therapy in humans are currently underway. 17 
Techniques for germ cell gene therapy in humans have already been 
developed. 18 Gene therapy offers the potential to treat genetic diseases 
such as cystic fibrosis. If offers the potential to help future generations, as 
well as to harm them. It enables the present generatJ.on to unpose our tdea 
of genetic perfection on future generations, raising the spectre of 
eugenics. 19 The issues raised by gene therapy are wider than the law, and 
include moral, bioethical, religious and social issues. In somatic cell gene 
therapy only the genes of somatic cells are modified. The changes made 
are not incorporated into the individuals sperm or ova, and are therefore 
not passed on to their children. In germ cell gene therapy the genes in the 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
For example some types of cancer and cardiovascular disease. 
United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Human Gene Therapy (Washington, D.C.: Office of 
lechnology Assessment, 1984). 
L Pnor Somatic and Germ Lme Gene Therapy: Current 
Status and Prospects (Royal Corrurussion on New Reproductive 
Technologies, Canada, 1992) vii. 
For example see: A Coghlan "Outrage greets patent on designer 
,,.,.,......,n O A .,...,1 1 OOA l\f,.,u i;;:,,.,..,. .. t.,,t A 
t.':)}J\.IJ.111 ./ f"l.plll .J. ./ _.,...,. J. 'f\.ll'V IJ\.,J.\.1J.lt..1.0l. "'1". 
J Harding "Beyond Abortion: Human Genetics and the New 
Eugenics" (1991) 18 Pepperdine Law Review 471. 
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germ cells are modified. Consequently this modification will be passed on 
to future generations. 
IV PATENT LAW 
In New Zealand patent law is governed by the Patents Act 1953. The 
purpose of obtaining a patent is to protect a product or a process that is 
the result of inventive thought. The patent holder is granted an exclusive 
right to make, use. exercise and vend a manner of new manufacture witlun 
New Zealand.20 The patent will usually last for 16 years.21 The preparat10n 
of a patent application and the process of obtaining a patent is known as 
"patent prosecution" The applicant for the patent must submit a 
specification with the application which explains precisely how the 
invention works. Patents are available on "inventions" which are 
industrially applicable, novel, and mvolve an mventive step.22 
Inventions arc defined in section 2(1) of the Patents Act 1953 as "any 
manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent and grant of 
pnvtlege WJ.thm s.6 o1 the Statute of Monopolies and any new method or 
process of testing applicable to the improvement or control of 
manufacture; and includes an alleged invention". The Statute of 
Monopolies 1623 declared that monopolies generally would be void and 
unlawful. Section 6 defined which monopolies would be lawfol:23 
10 
21 
22 
23 
The Patents Regulations 1954, Third Schedule, Letters Patent. 
This is to be increased to 20 years by the GATT (Uruguay Round) 
Bill 1994. 
Reform of the Patents Act 1953 Proposed Recommendations 
(Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1997) 8 
"The Statute of Monopolies" means the Act of the 21st year of the 
reign of King James the First, chapter 3 intituled "An Act 
concerning monopolies and dispensations with penal laws and the 
forfeiture thereof'. 
8 
Provided also and be it declared and enacted, that any declaration 
beforementioned shall not extend to any Letters Patent and grants of pnvilege 
for the tenn of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole 
working or making of any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to 
the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures, wluch others at 
the b.me of makmg such Letters Patent and grants shall not use, so as also they 
be not contrary to the law, nor mischievous to the state, by raising prices of 
commocht:J.es dt home, 01 hmt of trade, or generally mconvement... 
Mere discoveries cannot be patented. There must be some inventive 
ingenuity in the subject of the patent application, although "a mere scintilla 
of inventive faculty may be sufficient to support a patent". 24 
The acceptance of an application for a patent can be objected to on 
several grounds including: anticipation ( or prior publication); obviousness 
(the invention is obvious and involves no inventive step); and the complete 
specification does not sufficiently and fairly describe the invention. 
The owner of a plant variety may seek protection under the Plant Variety 
Rights Act 1987 or the Patents Act 1953, or both.15 
The New Zealand Patents Act 1953 was drafted well before the 
emergence of the biotechnology industry. Reform of the Act is undetway 
and further reforms are anticipated. How should these reforms respond to 
the moral and t;dlical issues raised by biotechnology inventions? 
V THE ISSUES RAISED 
Should patents be available on the products of biotechnology research 
once the requirements of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability 
24 
25 
Maunderv Wanganw Sash & Door Factory & Timber Co. Ltd 
f1928] NZLR 566, 581. 
C Brown "Protecting plant varieties: Developments in New 
Zealand" (1988) 18 VUWLR 83 
9 
have been met? Is it acceptable to grant property rights in human genes, 
DNA sequences, transgenic animals and new methods of medical 
treatment? Do moral and ethical considerations have a legitimate place in 
the making of these decisions? 
One problem in this area is to separate out issues which inherently relate to 
the patent system from those of a more general nature which would be 
best regulated elsewhere. For example if society is opposed to the 
unnecessary infliction of pain and su:ff ering on animals then this can be 
reflected in specific laws aimed at protectmg animal welfare. However, 
taking a wider view, if a society is concerned for animal welfare, should it 
allow its patent system to provide an mcenttve to mnovatton in areas likely 
to threaten animal welfare? Further, should it grant property rights in the 
means to inflict that suffering? The wider view involves incorporating 
concepts of ethics, morality and human dignity into patent law. If this 
wider view is adopted, then there is the practical problem of trying to 
deftne rules and tests for patentabilitv wluch will deny the incentive of 
patent protection from those areas deemed to be undesirable, while 
continuing to provide an incentive in other, often closely related, areas 
which are considered to be acceptable. Some degree of certainty ts 
required, so researchers will know what is and what is not patentable. 
The practical problem posed by the wider view appears to be more easily 
solved in some areas than in others. It is relatively easy to render all 
methods of medical treatment of human beings unpatentable on ethical 
grounds. 26 A blanket exclusion on ethical grounds is workable. However, 
in the area of transgenic animals it is harder to decide when suffering to an 
animal is outweighed by the benefits of an invention. Likewise, it is 
difficult to decide how much human genetic material can be incorporated 
26 The problem of distinguishing cosmetic from therapeutic or 
prophylactic treatments still remains. 
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into a non-human animal, before human dignity is compromised. 27 
A.dvocates of granting patents on biotechnology inventions take a fairly 
uniform position. They argue that once the traditional criteria of 
patentability have been met then patents should be available for 
biotechnology inventions. Morality does not properly belong as a 
consideration in patent Jaw The patent office is not equipped to make 
moral judgements. Techno1ogy is neutral it is neither moral or immoral, it 
is what people do with technology that is sometimes immorai and a patent 
does not require a person to use an invention in an immoral way. 28 
Further, the concept of morality it too subjective and changes over time. 
The contraceptive pill nught once have been regarded as immoral but it is 
no longer so regarded in many countries. The role of the patent office is to 
promote technology and not to regulate it. Regulation should be achieved 
by other laws directed to specific areas of concern. The patent system is to 
exist in a moral vacuum, hermetically sealed to exclude moral 
cons1deratJ.ons and "other ways of knowing" .19 
Patents on DNA and genes will encourage research and innovation leading 
to great benefits for society. People have selectively bred and owned 
arumals for centuncs, so patents on transgenic animals are not really so 
new, and do not raise new moral issues. Likewise, the patenting of 
methods of medical treatment will encourage medical research and lead to 
l7 
28 
29 
Some people may even take the view that the utilitarian approach 
of balancing the competing considerations is not acceptable, and 
will argue that no amount of animal suffering can be outweighed 
by the benefits, and introducing even a single human gene into a 
non-human animal is contrazy to human dignity. 
E J Sease "From Microbes, to Com Seeds, to Oysters, to r..£.ce: 
Patentability of New Life Forms" (1989) 38 Drake Law Review 
551. 
A Wells "Patenting New Life Forms: An Ecological Perspective" 
[1994] 3 EIPR 111. 
11 
the discovery of new methods of treatment. Any cost to the 
physician-patient relationship will be outweighed by these benefits. 
Denying patents on biotechnology inventions will not stop biotechnology 
research.30 
Those who argue for the removal of moral considerations from patent law 
are frequently those involved in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industries,31 or patent attorneys.32 These groups have a vested interest in 
broadening the sphere of patentable subject matter. However, patent 
attorneys may also benefit from the disputes which could result from the 
application of morahty proVISions. 
Opponents of patents on biotechnology inventions include animal welfare 
groups, patient's orgarusatlons, professional healthcare groups and 
watchdog groups. 33 Groups opposed to patents on human genes argue that 
such patents are unethical and will slow down the progress of research. 
Groups opposed to patents on transgenic animals are concerned about 
experimentation on animals, because; of the pam caused to such animals, 
and uncertamty as to where these experiments might lead.34 1ney object to 
the concept of "owning life" and fear the consequences of the erosion of 
30 
31 
32 
33 
14 
J Kim "Patent Law: Patenting Animal Life: Another Scapegoat for 
Small Interest Groups" (1989) 42 Oklahoma Law Review 131. 
For example AW White: AW White "Patentability of Medical 
Treatment, Wellcome Foundation's (Hitching's) Application" 
[1980] EIPR November, 364. 
For example M Bennett: M Bennett "The transgenic animal 
debate" NZ Biotechnology Association Newsletter No.18, August 
1993. 
An example of a vociferous watchdog group in the US is the 
Foundation on Econormc Trends, headed by Jeremy Rifkin. 
Some animal rights groups see a future full of sad mutant animals 
twisted into unnatural forms by greedy and inconsiderate genetic 
engineers: R Dresser "Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New 
Animal Life" (Summer 1988) 28 Jurimetrics Journal 399. 
12 
"species integrity". Animals are viewed as possessing the right not to have 
their species integrity destroyed by the widespread manipulation and 
interchanging of their genetic material. As species integrity is eroded the 
natural order will gradually be broken down into an assortment of artificial 
organisms manufactured by people. 
A society that allows the patenting of life forms is institutionalising a 
devaluation of respect for life. To these groups patenting animals signals 
that society is regressing to an extreme Cartesian view of animals as 
"soulless, unfeeling creatures that may be treated like machine parts".35 
Fatm groups arc not opposed to the application of biotechnology, rather 
they are eager to benefit from more productive genetically engineered 
livestock. They have no moral objection to genetically modified livestock 
and crops. However. they are opposed to patents on the products of 
biotechnology because they will have to pay to benefit from them. 36 The 
most significant difference here is the self-reproducing nature of the 
invention and the theoretical and practical issues that this raises for patent 
law. There is also concern that allowing patents on animals will lead to a 
reduction in the diversity of farm animals. Greater dependence will be 
placed on fewer genetically superior breeds. Maintaining the genetic 
diversity of species is an important issue but it is not usually viewed as 
being a moral issue. 
Arguments against the patenting of methods of medical treatment are 
largely ethical. The fear is that such patents will interfere with the 
physician-patient relationship, either by intruding upon physician 
autonomy and/or physician-patient confidentiality. Physician autonomy 
--------- -
35 
36 
S Krimsky Biotechmcs and Society The Rise of Industrial 
Genetics (Praeger, New York, 1991). 
M Paver "All Animals Are Patentable, But Some Are More 
Patentable Than Others" (1992) March Patent World 9. 
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will be impaired if a physician has to obtain a licence for a fee from a 
patentee before they can use a method of treatment. Physician-patient 
autonomy is potentially compromised by the prying of patentees trying to 
detect unauthorised use of their patented method. 
Patents on methods of medical treatment might impede the progress of 
medical research by introducing a commercial interest which will intertere 
with the timing and content of the publication of research results. A 
physician who invents a new method of treatment will face a potential 
conflict between personal commercial gain and the patients intere;;sts. They 
will want to describe the new method in the best possible light (in order to 
encourage others to licence the method), possibly neglecting to describe 
the negative aspects of the treatment fully. Subsequently, physicians who 
take out a licence will want to recoup the cost (the "opportunity cost") of 
the licence by using it. If a patient is on the borderline of requiring a 
patented treatment or not, then the decision whether to treat or not may be 
influenced by the phys1c1ans investment m the licence fee. 
The challenge these issues raise is to design a patent system which 
encourages innovation while not swamping human dignitv or values. 
VI SOME RELEVANT REPORTS 
Some recent reports on the issues surrounding new technologies may 
provide some guidance on how moral considerations might be 
incorporated into patent law, and in identifying some guiding principles. 
A The Warnock Report 
In 1984 the Warnock Inquiry in the Uruted Kmgdom looked at the issues 
of sutTogacy and research on human embryos, and led to the passing of 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK). The Warnock 
Committee recognised the wide diversity in moral feelings between 
14 
different groups in society and the need to identify pnnciples to govern the 
use of new technology. 37 
B Canadian Roya/, Commission on New Reprodu.cti.ve 
Technologies 
In Canada the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies 
chose to adopt an "ethic of care" as a guiding principle. The ethic of care 
holds that:38 
moral reasoning is not solely. or even primarily, a matter of finding rules to 
arbitrate between conflicting interests Rather, moral W1sdom and sensitivity 
cons1St, in the first instance, in focusing on how our interests are often 
interdependent And moral reasoning involves trying to find creative solutions 
that can remove or reduce conflict. rather than sun ply subordinating one 
person's interests to another. The pnonty, therefore, is on helping relationships 
to flourish by seeking to foster the digruty of the individual and the welfare of 
the community. 
The Commission set out the following guiding principles to assist tn 
implementmg the ethic ot care: md1vidual autonomy equality, respect for 
human life and dignity, protection of the vulnerable, 
non-commerciali?..ation of reproduction, appropriate use of resources, 
accountability, balancing of individual and collective interests. 39 
The Commission considered that the ethic of care was relevant to patent 
law, and observed that the basic principles of patent law which were 
37 
38 
39 
Department ofllealth and Social Security Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(1984, "the Warnock Report"). 
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies Proceed 
With Care: Fznal Report of the Royal Commission on New 
Reproductzve Technologies (Canada Communications (iroup 
Publishing, Ottawa, 1993), 52. 
Above n 38, 53. 
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developed 200 years ago were not designed to deal with some of the 
issues raised by modern technology.40 The Commission felt that further 
study was required into the implications of granting patents in the area of 
new reproductive technologies. However, the Commission did not hesitate 
to conclude that medical treatments should not be patentable. The 
Commission noted that the reasons for the existing non-patentability of 
medical treatments in Canada included the public policy interest in the 
"unimpeded access to medical treatments, the need for impartial 
evaluation of their success, and the avoidance of conflict of interest for 
physicians. "41 
C Otago Bioethics Research Centre 
The prevailing view among those who have considered the issue ts that 
somatic cell gene therapy is acceptable, 42 while at present germ cell gene 
therapy is not.43 In New Zealand the Bioetlucs Research Centre (BRC)44 
has recommended that germ cell gene therapy should be banned by 
legislation, while somatic cell gene therapy should be allowed. With the 
latter being restricted to the treatment of serious medical conditions. The 
BRC also recommended that the issue of patenting in connection with 
biotechnology be investigated. 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Above n 38, 720. 
Above n 38, 721. 
See "Report by the Committee on the Hhics of Gene Therapy 
(U.K.)" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 January 
1992. 
Above n 14, 185. -
Biotechnology Revisited, Ethical and Legal Issues in the 
Application of Biotechnology to Medical Practice, A Report for 
the Medical Council of New Zealand by the Bioethics 
Research Centre, University of Otago, November 1991. 
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D The Health Research Council, Report on Gene Therapy 
The Health Research Council (HRC) commissioned a report on gene 
therapy for the Ministry of Health and the Ministry for the Environment. 4~ 
The HRC Working Party preparing the report were given a broad brief to 
look at the issues surrounding gene therapy. The HRC report is due to be 
released for public comment late in 1994. This report may offer some 
guidance which could inform the approach patent law takes towards gene 
therapy. 
E Assisted Human Reproductum, NavigaJi.ng Our Future 
In New Zealand the Department of Justice recently issued a report on new 
reproductive technologies. 46 This report avoided specifically discussing 
gene therapy due to the forthcoming release of the HRC report on gene 
therapy. However, the report supports the adoption of an "ethic of care" 
(as propounded by the Canadian Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies) as a guiding principle in policy formation, 
which includes respect for human life and dignity. The Committee 
considered the commercialisation of the use of human tissue to be 
contrary to the dignity of human tissue:47 
46 
47 
we nevertheless see great value in acknowledging that all human t:lssul! has 
ma.na. This means that not only the embryo but also gametes should be 
accorded dignity. From this, it follows that there should be no 
commercialisation of the use of tissue, ie the sale of human parts, including 
The New Zealand Medical Association has not taken a position on 
gene therapy yet. However, it is currently on the agenda of their 
Public Issues Advisory Committee which is awaiting the HRC 
report before proceeding: personal communication K. C'rtbb, 
Chairman Public Issues Advisory Committee, 3 May 1994. 
WR Atkm, P Reid Assisted Human Reproduction, Navigating 
Our Future (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1994) 
Above n 46, 29. 
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gametes and embryos, shows disrespect for the mana ofhwnan tissue. 
Another specific example that followi> 1s that there should be no development 
of animal/human hybrids. 
Whether the Committee intended the words "human parts" to include 
genes and DNA is not absolutely clear, but this would seem to follow 
since it expressly referred to the single celled and microscopic gametes 
(sperm and owm), which are little more than genes packaged in a delivery 
system. The granting of patents over human genes and DNA is 
undoubtedly a form of commercialisation, and is therefore, according to 
the Committee, contrary to human dignity. 
The Committee believed that animal/human hybrids should not be 
developed at all. This raises the question of what percentage of human 
genetic material has to be inserted into an animal for it to be considered to 
be an animal/hybrid? Is the insertion of a single human gene into a mouse 
enough to render the mouse an animal/human hybrid? Many animals have 
already had single human genes inserted into their genome. One suspects 
that more than a single gene is required, but exactly how much more is 
difficult to define. It would also depend upon the quality and nature of 
what was transferred, and not just on how much. 
However, onl.-1.. the line ts ,rossed and a transgenic arumal is considered to 
be an animal/human hybrid, the Committee believe this to be contrary to 
human digruty. Logically it follows that the Committee would also 
consider the granting of patents on such animals to be contrary to human 
dignity. Such patents would involve the commercialisation of human parts 
and would act as an incentive to the development of animal/human 
hybrids. 
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F The reports support a rok for morality in patent law 
The lesson from the reports discussed above is that the application of new 
technologies should be done within a moral framework, guided by agreed 
moral principles. Patent law cannot be used as a complete system for the 
regulation of new technologies. However, considering the close 
association of these new technologies and the patent system 1t is 
inappropriate to try to exclude moral considerations from the patent 
system, where they can form a useful part of society's overall response to 
these technologies. This is particularly so when society regards the holding 
of certain property rights to be contrary to human dignity or otheiwise 
inappropnate. 
VII MORALITY IN THE LAW 
Section 17(l)(b) of the Patents Act 1953 provides that the Commissioner 
of Patents may decline an application for a patent on an invention the use 
of which might be contrary to law or morality. 
Opponents of the consideration of moral issues in patent law assert that 
morality is too subjective a concept to be a legitimate requirement of 
patent law. Morality changes over tnne and people have different views 
about what is immoral. Further. it is said that the patent office does not 
have the necessary expertise to assess what is immoral. Therefore they 
conclude that morality has no place in patent law. If something is immoral 
it would be illegal under some other law. They ignore the fact that the law 
frequently caJls upon decision makers to make moral judgements, and that 
morality provisions are not unusual in the general law or in intellectual 
property law. They also ignore the possibility that there may be some 
inventions which society does not wish to render illegal, but does not wish 
to positively encourage by the granting of patents. 
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A Morali.ty in the genera/, law 
Morality has long been, and remains, a feature of the general law. There is 
nothing unusual about the law addressing moral issues and applying moral 
tests. Underlying the criminal law are moral values. One example of this is 
the notion of dishonesty. Before a person will be convicted of fraud in 
New Zealand it is necessary to prove that they had an "intent to defraud". 
This test includes the moral test of dishonesty. In R v Coombridge the 
Court of Appeal said:48 
We think that in order to act fraudulently an accused person must . . . act 
deliberately and with knowledge that he is ac1Jng in breach of his legal 
ohligation But we are of the opinion that if an accused person sets up a claim 
that m all the crrcumstances he honestly bebeved that he was Justified m 
departing from lus strict obligation, albeit for some purpose ofhts own, then 
lus defence should be left to the Jury for consideration provided at least that 
there ts evidence that in all the crrcumstances his conduct, although legally 
wrong, might nevertheless be regarded as honest. In other words the jury 
should be told that the accused cannot be convicted unless he has been shown 
to have acted dishonestly. 
In R v Speakman49 the Court of Appeal con:finned that the test for 
dishonesty m Coombridge was a subjective one based on the accused's 
own beliefs. 
In R v Feely50 the English Court of Appeal said that for there to be a 
conviction for theft there had to be "moral obloqu."' The English Court 
of Appeal in R v Ghosh51 adopted a mixed subjective and objective test 
for dishonesty. The objective limb involved asking whether the accused 
48 
49 
50 
51 
[1985] 2 NZLR 381, 387. 
(1989) 5 CRNZ 250. 
[19731 QB 530, 541 (CA). 
-----------~- -
[1982] 2 All ER 689; (1982] QB 1053. 
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acted dishonestly "according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and 
honest people". 52 The adoption of a subjective standard has been criticised 
in England. 53 
Part VII of the Crimes Act 1961 is headed "CRIMES AGAINST 
RELIGION, MORALITY, AND PUBLIC WELFARE" (emphasis 
added). Crimes included in this part include the distribution or exhibition 
of indecent matter, the performance of an indecent act in a public place 
and performing an indecent act with intent to insult or offend. 
B Morality in intellectual, property law 
1 Morality in copyright law 
In New Zealand copyright subsists in original works as a result of the 
Copyright Act 1962. The Act does not deny copyright in works which are 
immoral, illegal or irreligious. However the courts have developed a 
common law doctrine of non-protection of works the sa]e and publication 
of which would be contrary to the public interest. 
In the nineteenth century Lord Eldon refused to grant injunctions to 
prevent the infringement of the copynght in what he considered to be 
immoral works. 
54 This doctrine was firmly established in Stockdale v 
Onwhyn55 in which copyright protection was denied to a book'6 detailing 
the adventures of a courtesan. 57 
52 
53 
54 
56 
57 
Above n 51. 
Glanville Williams Textbook of Criminal Law (2 ed, Stevens, 
1 ondon, 1983) 722. 
Walcot v Walker (1802) 7 Ves 1; Southey v Sherwood (1817) 2 
Mcr435. 
(1826) 5 B & C 173. 
The Memoirs of Harriet Wilson. 
The House of Lords referred to the non-protection of immoral 
works in A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd f1988] 3 All ER 545. 
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2 Morality and passing off 
In the Advocaat case58 Lord Diplock set out the five elements necessary 
to establish passing off. However, he made the point that these five 
elements were merely what is necessary to establish passing off, not what 
is sufficient:59 
The presence of those characteristics is enough unless there is also present 
. ome exceptional feature which justifies, on grounds of public policy, 
withhokling from a person who has suffered injmy in consequence of the 
decep1lon practlsed on prospective customers or consumers of his product a 
remedy in law against the deceiver ( emphasis added) 
There may be individual cases in which the courts withhold a remedy in 
passing off on public policy grounds. Lord Diplock did not elaborate on 
what matters of public policy he had in mind. Drysdale and Silverleaf have 
speculated on what might fall within this category:60 
some matters in this category are not difficult to recognise. Thus the courts 
would not for example protect the reputation of a trader whose trade was 
immoral or illegal or whose goods could only be used for immoral or illegal 
purposes 
This would be logical considering the prohibition on the registration of 
immoral trade marks under the Trade Marks Act 1953.61 It would be 
strange if the common law of passing off protected an immoral trade mark 
which was prohibited from being registered on moral grounds. 
59 
60 
61 
Erven Warmnk B. V. v J Tuwnend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [19791 AC 
731 :[ 1979] 2 All ER 927 (the Advocaat case). 
Above n 58, 938. 
T Dry"d•,lo "Ild l\,f <;';1,,,, .. loaf D_,.,"'SI·,~,. 1')>.fff ,..,,.., ~ .. rlp~acf;Ce J t .. i3 Q.l\,, U i.V.1 U..UV\.IJ.J.\,, 1 WJ lil5 \. 'Jj JUf"V WllU. I I, 
(Butterworths, London, 1986) 16. 
Section l6Trade Marks Act 1953. 
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3 i\t/orality and the Trade Marks Act 1953 
Section 16 of the Trade Marks Act 1953 provides that: 
It shall not be lawful to register as a trade mark or part of a trade mark any 
scandalous matter or any matter the use of which would be likely to deceive or 
cause confusion or would be contrary to law or morality or would otherwise be 
cru;entltled to protechon ma l..ourt of Just:J.ce. 
The purpose of this section is to protect the public interest. 62 
Seen.on 11 of the Trade Marks Act 1938 (UK) provides that it "shall not 
be lawful to register as a trade mark any matter the use of which . . . would 
be contrary to law or morality ... ". fu addition to section 11 the Registrar 
has a discretion under section 17(2) to refuse applications "as he may 
think nght". 
Article 3 of the 1'.,C Directive on Trade Marks provides that a trade mark 
may be refused registration or invalidated on the ground that "the trade 
mark is contrary to public policy or accepted principles of morality." 
The Trade Marks Act 1953 is currently being reviewed. The Ministry of 
Commerce have expressed doubts about the continued existence of a 
public policy/morality exclusion. According to the Ministry:63 
62 
63 
Assessments of this nature will inevitably mvolve subjective judgements by the 
Commissioner. It could be argued that these matters are more appropnately 
dealt with by other pohcy mstruments. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Company v Hy-line Chicks Pty Ltd [1978] 
2 NZLR 50, 63, per Richardson J. 
Reform of the Trade Marks Act 19 5 3, Proposed 
Recommendations (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1991 ). 
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The Ministry do not actually make the argument why a change from the 
current position is indicated. 
4 Morality tutd designs 
Section 43(1) of the Registered Designs Act 1949 (UK) provides that: 
Nothing m this Act shall be construed as authonsmg or requiring the registrar 
to register a design the use of which would, m his opinion, be contrary to law 
or morality . 
The Registrar also has a genera] discretion under section 3(5) to refuse 
applications "as he thinks fit". 
In Masterman's Design64 the applicant had applied to register a design for 
a doll which included a depiction of male genitalia. The Superintending 
Examiner held that the application was not contrary to law or morality 
under section 4l(1 ). However, the application was refused under section 
3(5) on the ground that registration would be likely to offend the 
susceptibilities of a not insubstantial number of persons. The applicant 
appealed against this decision to the Registered Designs Appeal Tribunal. 
In the Appeal Tribunal Aldous J held that the test could not be solely 
whether a section of the public would be offended. However, some 
designs depicting nudity which would give offence, which might be 
pornographic, and which people would not regard as suitable for public 
display, should be refused registration. These designs "should not have the 
protection of property nghts provided by Parhament. "65 Designs with 
racialist connotations might also be refused. 
64 
65 
[1991] RPC 89. 
Above n 64, 103. 
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Aldous J considered "whether the design is of the kind that should be 
given the protection of the law including whether the design is of such a 
nature that its use would offend moral principles of right-thinking 
members of the public, such that it would be wrong to protect it." Aldous 
J believed that no reasonable person would object to the doll in question 
being sold, and allowed the appeal. 
66 
In New Zealand designs can be registered under the Designs Act 1953. 
Section 7(3) of this Act lS equivalent to section 3(5) of the Registered 
Designs Act 1949 (UK). 
It is clear from the above discussion that the concept of morality is not 
alien to intellectual property law. Parliament and the cowts have long felt 
that 1t was appropnate to deny protection to intellectual property that 
might be immoral or have immoral uses. This belief has been reflected in 
specific statutory provisions, and in common law and equitable doctrines. 
VIII MORALITY AND PATENT LAW 
Many biotechnology inventions may potentially be objected to on moral 
grounds. Like other areas of intellectual property law, patent laws have for 
many years included provisions which provided for the exclusion from 
protection of inventions which were "contrary to morality".
67 However, 
such provisions appear to have been infrequently invoked. 68 There are 
66 
67 
68 
Aldous J also commented (above n 64, 104) that "Cowts of 
Equity have in the past refused to grant inJunctions to protect 
copyright in scandalous and pornographic works, but I cannot 
envisage that a Court of Equity would ref use to grant an injunction 
to protect the design in question". This apparent reference to the 
cases discussed above in Part VII B 1 suggested that Aldous J 
appeared to believe that there was a possible equitable jurisdiction 
to refuse the design in question.· 
For example the Patents and Design Act 1907 sec 75. 
R Nott "Plants and animals: Why they should be protected by 
patents and variety rights" (1993) July/August, Patent World 45. 
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morality provisions in the European Patent Convention, 69 and in the patent 
law of the United Kingdom,70 Japan71 and New Zealand.72 Many other 
nations have similar provisions in their patent law. 73 
Section lO(l)(b) of the Patents Act 1949 (UK) provided that the 
Comptroller of Patents could refuse an application if it appeared that the 
use of the invent10n would be contrary to law or morality. 
The UK Patent Office Manual of Office Practice gives little guidance on 
what will be regarded to be contrary to morality. However, it does state 
that inventions relating to contraception and the control of fertility are not 
to be objected to on this ground, while applications for "sexual appliances 
of an improper character are always refused under section 1 O". 74 
Instruments of torture are also regarded as being immoral. In practice the 
"immoral invention" exclusion is virtually never used in the UK. 
From the early nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century the courts 
in the US denied patents on immoral inventions, such as gambling 
machines and inventions intended to defraud buyers. 75 
IX PATENTS ON INVENTIONS CO~TRARY TO LAW 
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 1623 provides that inventions 
which are "contrary to the law" are not the proper subject for the grant of 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Article 53(a) European Patent Convention. 
Section 1(3)(a) Patents Act 1977 (UK). 
Article 32 of the Japanese Patent I .,aw. 
Section 17(l)(b) Patents Act 1953. 
A Reverdin and F Schlaepfer Katzarov's Manual on Industrial 
Property All Over the World (9 ed, Katzarov S.A., Geneva, 
1993). 
Patent Office Manual of Office Practice (Patents) UK, First 
Edition (including revised pages) para 10,13. 
RP Merges "Intellectual Property m Life Forms: The Patent 
System and Controversial Technologies" (1988) 47 Maryland L 
Rev l051, 1058. 
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Letters Patent. This provision is still in force in New Zealand as a part of 
the definition o an mvention. "'6 Something which is contrary to the law is 
not an invention and is therefore not patentable. n Section 17 ( 1 )( c) of the 
Patents Act 1953 is of similar effect and provides that the Commissioner 
may refuse an application if the use of the invention would be contrary to 
law. The focus of this provision is on the use of the invention. These 
exclus10ns on the grounds of illegality can be used to implement moral 
Judgements, tor example by involving predictions about how an mvent1on 
will be used. 
There are at least three distinct areas within the concept of inventions 
bemg contrary to law. First, there are those mventions which are not illegal 
to own or use per se, but which may be used to facilitate the breaking of a 
law. Some inventions in this category may have some entirely legitimate 
uses, as well as a less legitimate one. This group is potentially enormous 
since virtually any mvention could be used in an illegal manner. However, 
for some inventions the primary mtended use is clearly not legitimate. 
Secondly, there are inventions which it is not illegal to own but which it is 
illegal to use. Thirdl) there are inventions which it would be illegal to own 
and/ or use at all. 
The purpose and value of the illegality exclusion is different for these 
three groups of inventions. For the first and second groups it can serve the 
useful function of denying patent protection to inventions which have the 
socially undesirable purpose of facilitating the breaking of the law, while 
perhaps not being illegal in themselves. This exclusion appears to have a 
76 
77 
Section 2 Patents Act 1953. 
In copyright law the Courts have developed a doctrine of denying 
copyright protection for illegal works: Wright v Tallis (1845) 1 CB 
893; Slingsby v Bradford Patent Truck and Trolley Co [1905] 
WN 122; British Oxygen Co v T1qu1d Air Ltd f1925l C'h 383 
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moral element to it. It does not serve the public interest to allow the patent 
system to encourage innovation in these areas. 
However, for the third group of inventions, the illegality exclusion serves 
no purpose other than perhaps to save the patent office from wasting time 
processing patent applications which if granted could never be exercised. 
Inventors may still wish to patent such inventions in some situations, such 
as if a change in the law is anticipated which would render a presently 
illegal invention legal. The Ministry of Commerce have argued for the 
removal of the "contrary to law" exclusion, apparently with only the third 
group of inventions in mind. 78 They appear to adopt the position taken by 
the EPO m the course of the Harvard/Onco-mouse application where the 
EPO noted that a patent was a right of exclusion and not an obligation to 
use79 and that as a consequence the illegality exclusion was unnecessary, 
because illegal inventions will be prohibited by other laws. This ignores the 
socially valuabk ftmction the illegality exclusion can perform by 
somettrnes excluding inventions in the first two groups outlined above. 
In The Wellcome Foundation Ltd (Hitching's) Application80 Davison CJ 
said that the words "contrary to law", in section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies, meant that anything designed to be used for an illegal 
purpose cannot be the proper subject matter for a patent. Implements for 
housebreaking, picking pockets and picking locks are given as examples. 
He observed that "fi]t would be absurd if by one law patents might be 
granted to reward persons for providing the means of violating any other 
law".81 But what about the lock-pick invented to facilitate the work of 
reputable lock-smiths? Is it to be denied patent protection? This is one of 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Above n 22, 9. 
See Part 'CIT F helow. 
[1979] 2 NZLR 591;[1980] RPC 314, 332. 
Above n 80, 322. 
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the problems with the illegality exclusion. Clearly is must be used with 
caution 
The UK Patent Office Manual of Office Practice82 states that applications 
which might, or would be, contrary to the common law or statute law may 
be refused absolutely, or accepted if a disclaimer to the use contrary to law 
is inserted into the specification. Applications which have been refused on 
this ground include: an explosive safe or other device designed to maim or 
kill a trespasser or burglar; bombs intended for sWTeptitious use; devices 
which contravene Acts against cruelty to animals; and inventions which 
might be used to evade Inland Revenue and Customs duties. An 
applicat10n for a spiked device for stopping motor vehicles was allowed 
subject to the insertion of a disclaimer of use contrary to law. No 
objection is raised against applications for gambling appliances and 
apparatus. Special restrictions have been applied to applications for patents 
on nuclear devices and weapons technology. 83 
The Ministry of Commerce proposal to remove the exclusion from 
patentability of inventions which are contrary to law, can perhaps be 
viewed as one aspect of the attempt to remove moral values from patent 
law, as a part of the wider attempt to isolate patent law from the values of 
society as a whole. 
X PATENTS ON LIVING MATTER 
There has long been doubt about the patentability of living matter. This 
doubt has existed in many jurisdictions and been founded on several 
82 
83 
Above n 74, Volume II, paras 10,4 to 10,12. 
For example sections 25 and 26 Patents Act 1953, 42 USC section 
218l(a) (1982). 
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grounds. 84 The patentabihty of higher orgarusms has been particularly 
controversial. 85 Such patents undoubtedly raise moral issues. 
The application of DNA technology to produce new, or modified, life 
forms has led to a flood of patent applications for transgenic animals. 
These applications have caused debate on the ethical and public policy 
issues such patents raise. Before 1970 it was widely accepted that only 
primitive forms of life, such as yeasts86 and bacteria, could be patented. 87 
In 1980 the New Zealand Asststant Commissioner of Patents issued a 
Ruling, 88 as a guideline to patent examiners, which stated that: 
The distinction between living and inanimate matter no longer is appropriate, if 
1t ever was, as a dtstmct:Jon between non patentable and patentable matter. 
The development of transgenic animals has raised the issue of whether a 
patent on such an animal could ever amount to a form of slavery. And if 
so, whether such patents should be refused as being either contrary to law, 
morality or human dignity. To grant a property right in a transgenic mouse 
containing one human gene may appear innocuous, however granting a 
property right in a transgenic human containing one mouse gene may be a 
form of slavery. If transgenic animals containing human genes are to be 
patentable then one day a decision will have to be made at what point such 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
R Nott "Patent Protection for Plants and Animals" [1992] 3 EIPR 
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patents cease to be acceptable. The option to refuse such apphcations 
should be available. 
XI MEDICAL TREATMENT PATENTS IN NEW ZEALAND 
AND THE UK 
It has long been considered that methods of medical treatment are not 
patentable.89 In the UK between 1623 and 1977 the definition of an 
invention incorporated the phrase "any manner of new manufactures" and 
it was considered that a method of treatment was not a manner of new 
manufacture. 
One of the first attempts to obtain a patent for a method of treatment in 
the UK was C & W's Application.90 The Solicitor-General (acting as the 
Appeal Authority) decided that "new manufactures" within section 6 of 
the Statute of Monopolies must mean something associated with the 
manufacture or sale of products in commerce and trade. He held that "it 
cannot be suggested that the extraction of lead . . . [ from human bodies l ... 
is a process employed in any f01m of manufacture or of trade". The 
application was declined because it was not considered to come within the 
words "manner of new manufactures". As to ethical considerations 
involving "humanity" and the practice of the medical profession he added 
"I have altogether excluded such considerations from my mind" . Thus the 
89 
90 
In 1795 in Boulton v Bull there are comments by Buller J which 
suggest that even then it was thought that the discovery of a new 
medical use (the use of arsenic to treat agues for example) for a 
known compound would not be patentable: (1795) Dav. P.C. 
199. In Cunynghame's English Patent Practice (1884) it is said 
that "[tlhe art of curing an illness cannot be said to be an art of 
manufacture": cited by Davison CJ in the Wellc:ome case, above 
n 80, 334. 
(1914) 31 RPC 235: this case involved an application for a patent 
for a process for extracting metals from living bodies. 
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exclusion of medical treatment patents in the UK was not founded on 
ethical considerations. At least not explicitly. 
In GEC's Application91 Morton J said that for something to be a manner 
of manufacture it must result in the production of a vendible product, 
improve or restore a vendible product, or preserve a vendible product 
from deterioration. In Maeder v "Ronda" Ladies' Hairdressing Salon92 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal declined an application for the grant of 
a patent for a process for permanent waving of human hair on the basis 
that it did not produl.)e a vendible article. 
In National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner C?f 
Patents93 (the NRDC case) the High Court of Australia expanded the 
concept of "manner of new manufacture". The Court said that the right 
question to ask when deciding whether an mvention came within the 
words "manner of new manufacture" was "[i]s this a proper subject of 
letters patent according to the principles which have been developed for 
the application of s.6 of the Statute of Monopolies?". This was a relaxing 
of the "vendible product" test. It was said that "vendible" means a 
requirement for a practical commercial utility, while "product" means any 
end produced, such as the eradication of weeds. The High Court observed 
that "apparently ... processes for treating diseases of the human body" 
( emphasis added) were not to be regarded as a manner of manufacture. 
The Court did not have to decide this issue but appeared to have some 
doubt about it. 
In Swzft & Company v Commissioner of Patents94 Barrowclough CJ 
broke new ground when he held that biological processes were a manner 
91 
92 
93 
In the Matter of an Application for a Patent by GEC (1943) 60 
RPC 1 (GEC's Application). 
[1943] NZLR 122. 
[1961 l RPC 135:(1959) 102 CLR 252 . 
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of manufacture. In reaching his decision Barrowclough CJ was influenced 
by the NRDC (.,ase, while the earlier decic;ion of the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Maeder, which if followed might have suggested a different 
result, was not discussed. 
After the NRDC and Swift cases the ground given for the exclusion of 
methods of medical treatment in C & W's Applicatzon no longer 
adequately explained the continued exclusion of such methods. If the 
exclusion was to be maintained a different justification had to be found. 
The courts subsequently began to expressly refer to ethical arguments to 
maintain the exclusion. At the same time the exclusion was narrowed so as 
no longer to include the treatment of animals, 95 cosmetic treatments96 and 
methods of contraception. 97 
Although in a subsequent case Davison CJ complained that these courts 
were making "distinctions without a difference"98 this criticism is not 
entirely valid. The ethical issues surrounding cosmetic methods are 
different from those surrounding therapeutic methods. The concerns that 
surround maintatning the freedom of physicians to use potentially 
life-saving medical treatments do not extend to purely elective cosmetic 
treatments.99 Difficult problems surround drawing the line between what is 
94 
95 
96 
Q7 
98 
99 
[1960] NZLR 775: This case involved a method for tenderising 
meat by injecting enzymes into the living animal. 
In U.S. Rubber Company's Application [1964] RPC 104 in 
England a patent was allowed for a method of medical treatment, 
as long as it was restncted to non-human animals. 
Joos v Commissioner of Patents [1973] RPC 59. 
Scherzng A-G~i; Application [1971] RPC 337: Whitford J noted 
that it seemed that patents for medical treatment "in the strict 
sense" (ie for the cure or prevention of disease) were excluded. 
However, this did not include treatment which would produce a 
result in the human body, other than the cure or treatment of 
disease, for which people would pay. 
Above n 80, 34 l. 
Particularly cosmetic treatments sought by the vain and/or wealthy. 
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cosmetic and what is therapeutic or prophylactic. However, this practical 
problem aside, there is a genuine distinction between the two with regard 
to ethical issues. 
In Eli Lzl(v & Company's Applzcatzon100 the Court observed that the 
exclusion of methods of medical treatment seemed to be based in ethics 
rather than logic. 
In The Upjohn (' ompany (Robert's) Applzcation101 the English Court of 
Appeal upheld the exclusmn of methods of medical treatment from 
patentability. The Court felt that it was significant that section 41 of the 
Patents Act 1949 (UK)102 did not cover methods of treatment. Section 41 
included provisions for the compulsory licensing of substances capable of 
being used as a food or medicine. The purpose of this section was to 
ensure that where a patent for one of these inventions had been issued the 
Comptroller-General could make an order for a compulsory licence to 
ensure that the public would not be "held to ransom"103 and that the 
inventions could immediately be made available, while providing that the 
patentee was reasonably rewarded. 
Processes for medical treatment did not fall within section 41. If a patent 
could be obtained for such a process the Comptroller-General would not 
be able to safeguard the public by issumg compuls01y licences. This 
omission was interpreted by the Court as suggesting that at the time the 
Act was passed Parliament believed methods of medical treatment to be 
unpatentablc. Otherwise "here indeed would be a strange outcome" 104 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
[1975] RPC 438. 
[1977] RPC 94. 
------· ---
Equivalent to sec .51 Patents Act 1953, which has now been 
repealed. A similar provision was also present in the 1919 and 
1907 UK patent legislation. 
Above n 97, 343. 
Above n 101. 
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In The Wellcome Ji'oundatwn Ltd (Hitching's) Applzcation105 the New 
Zealand Supreme Court held that methods of medical treatment were 
patentable. According to White the judgment of Davi.son CJ exposed the 
non-patentability of methods of treatment as a myth. 106 
The case involved an application for a patent for the use of known 
compounds for the treatment of merungeal leukaemia or neoplasm's in the 
brain. These compounds had pre,,iously heen used to treat malaria. As 
these were known compounds the applicants did not seek, and could not 
have obtained, a patent for the compounds per se. The Assistant 
Commissioner of Patents refused to proceed with the application because 
it did not relate to a "manner of new manufacture" as required by the 
section 2 definition of an "invention". The applicant appealed to the 
Supreme Court. 
Davi.son C' J noted that the NRDC case expanded the definition of a 
"manner of new manufacture" and had been subsequently followed. 107 
Davi.son CJ considered the distinction between cosmetic and other forms 
of medical treatment which had been drawn in some of the cases108 to be 
artrlicial, as was the distinction between a contraceptive and medical 
treatment. Why should a patent be allowed for suppressing conception 
(Schering) but not for suppressing ulceration (The Upjohn Company 
(Robert's) Application)? The courts had drawn "distinctions without a 
difference". Davi.son CJ ignored the different ethical considerations these 
categories raise which might Justify different treatment under patent law. 
He observed that the ground on which C & W's Application was refused 
had been overtaken by an expansion hy the courts of the concept of a 
106 
107 
108 
Above n 80. 
Above n 31. 
Above n 80, 330. 
Such as Joos, above n 96. 
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manner of new manufacture, as illustrated in the NRDC and Schermg 
cases, and cou]d no longer be relied upon. 
The argument based on section 41 of the Patents Act 1949 (UK)109 could 
be simply overcome. When the legislation was enacted the law was based 
on C & W's Applicatzon. At that tune it was not thought that a process of 
medical treatment was patentable. However, following the decisions m the 
NRDC, Schering and Joos cases the law had changed. Methods of 
treatment were now within the definition of an invention and were 
patentable. Parliament could amend the Patents Act to allow for the 
compulsory licensing of methods of medical treatment if it desired. 110 
Davison CJ could "find no warrant in law for grounding such refusal on 
ethicaJ considerations" .111 If a drug could be the subject of a patent, and 
compulsory licences granted, then why not a method of treatment. Section 
51 of the New Zealand Act could easily be amended to allow for the 
granting of compulsory licences for methods of treatment. Davison CJ 
ignores the fact that a patent on a drug primarily restricts the activity of 
drug manufacturers while a patent on a method of treatment primarily 
restncts the activity of phys1c1ans. If one is prepared to restrict the activity 
of manufacturers, it does not follow that restricting the practice of 
physicians is also acceptable. This latter restriction raises different issues 
relating to the physician-patient relationship which are not raised by the 
placing of restrictions on drug manufacturers. Also, the use of compulsory 
licensing may raise different issues when applied to physicians rather than 
manufacturers Briefly, it is not sufficient to say as Davison CJ does, that 
109 
110 
111 
Section 51 of the Patents Act 1953. 
Since Davison CJ's JUdgment seen.on 51 of the Patents Act 1953 
has been repealed. The wording of section 51 no longer provides 
an argument for the exclusion of methods of medical treatment 
claims from patentability. 
Above n 80, 339. 
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if patents are allowed on drugs then it follows that they should also be 
allowed on methods of medical treatment. This is a gross 
over-simplification. A more detailed analysis of the benefits and costs of 
such a step must be carefully considered. 
The Commissioner of Patents appealed to the Court of Appeal. 112 Cooke J 
( as he then was) observed that unttl Davison CJ's decision no court in the 
Commonwealth had treated the words "manner of new manufacture" as 
extending to a method of treatment of human illness or disease. 
Somers J held that the opinion of the High Court of Australia in NRDC 
was also a correct statement of the law in New Zealand. 113 However, that 
case did not involve a method of medical treatment of human beings and 
could therefore be distinguished from the case before the Court. The 
Court accepted that the correct approach to determining whether a process 
or product was within the definition of an invention was not to ask 
whether it was a "manner of new manufacture", but rather to adopt the 
approach taken in NRDC and ask whether it is a proper subject of letters 
patent according to the principles which have been developed for the 
application of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. 
On the issue of the patentability of methods of medical treatment of 
human beings Cooke J said that "there remains . . . a deep-seated sense that 
the art of the physician or the surgeon in alleviating human suffering does 
not belong to the area of economic endeavour or trade and commerce" .114 
He cited with apparent approval the words of Kahn J in Wellcome 
Foundatzon v Plantex Ltd _.m 
112 
113 
114 
11S 
The Wel/come Foundation Ltdv Commissioner of Patents [1983] 
NZLR 385. 
Above n 112, 400. 
Above n 112, 388. 
Above n 112, 388, and [1974] RPC 514. 539. 
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There exist grave reasons against the creation of a monopoly by a patent m 
respect of medical treatment. We are confronted here with saving human hfe or 
alleviating human suffering and one should take great care lest a restriction on 
the freedom of action of those who treat, caused by patents, should affect 
human life or health. 
Somers J noted that the treatment of hwnan ailment was "of a special 
character"116 and that the policy content in the Courts decision was great. 
Cooke .T said that it was necessary to balance the need to encourage the 
interests of those engaged in research in cormection with the discovery and 
manufacture of new drugs, while not unduly restricting the work of those 
who engage in the therapy of humans. The temptation to break new 
ground and allow the patenting of methods of treating human illness or 
disease should be resisted, and the decision of whether to allow such 
patents should be left to Parliament. The issue required a wider range of 
review than the Court could accomplish. It would be necessary to consider 
the views of professional medical bodies. The economic implications also 
needed to be considered. The possibility that allowing patents in this area 
might result in "raising prices of commodities at home" or be "generally 
inconvenient" within the limitations contamed withm section 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies, could not be discounted. The Court unanimously 
allowed the appeal and found that methods for the medical treatment of 
human beings were not patentable. This is the present state of the law in 
New Zealand. 
The Wellcome case demonstrates that the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
accept that ethical considerations do have a place in patent law with regard 
to methods of medical treatment of human beings. Ethical concerns are 
thus to be permtttcd to restnct the area of patentable subject matter in 
New Zealand. There is no reason why, in an appropriate case, involving a 
116 Above n 112, 404. 
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transgenic animal for example, that moral concerns might not be 
successfully raised. These concerns could be raised when answering the 
question whether the invention in question is a proper subject of letters 
patent according to the principles which have been developed for the 
application of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. In the Wellcome 
case the Court of Appeal considered ethical concerns to be relevant to 
answering this question. They could also be raised under the specific 
morality provision. 117 
XII MORALITY IN EUROPEAN PATENT LAW 
The US and the European Union have taken widely divergent approaches 
to dealing with the moral issues raised by patents on methods of medical 
treatment and biotechnology inventions. The European Union has 
attempted to incorporate moral values into its patent system, while the US 
has refused to do so. 
A The European Patent Conventi,on 
In Europe patents can be obtained through the national patent offices of 
individual countries or through the centralised European Patent Office 
(EPO). The EPO was founded in 1977 under the European Patent 
Convention (EPC). European patents issued by the EPO are valid in up to 
17 nations and are granted according to uniform standards. Filing 
applications through the EPO is becoming increasingly popular. It has 
been estimated that about half of US applicants file for protection in 
Europe through the EPO. 118 
11 
118 
Sectton 17(l)(b) Patents Act 1953. 
Report of the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 
intellectual Property Rights: US Companies' Patent E'Cperiences 
in Japan (GAO/CTGD-93-126, July 1993) 13. Reproduced in 
(1993) 12 Biotechnology Law Report 717. 
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The European laws in this area are derived from the Strasbourg119 and 
UPOV Conventtons.120 These Conventions were drawn up at a time 
before the emergence ot modem biotechnology. 'The criteria for 
patentability drawn up at that tune no longer provide a clear demarcation 
line between the patentable and the unpatentable. The EPC adopted these 
inadequate criteria when it was drawn up in 1973. 
The EPO Guidelines for examination interpret the FPC and the Rules 
made under the EPC. The EPO Guidelines are only advisory general 
instructions to cover normal occurrenc,es and may be departed from by the 
EPO in an individual case. 121 'The European Commission have emphasised 
that the normal critena of patentability apply to biotechnology 
inventions. 122 
119 
120 
121 
122 
The Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of 
Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions. 
The International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants. 
The Chartered Institute of Patent Agents C.l.P A. Uuzde to the 
Patents Acts (3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1990) 3. 
Above n 11 
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B C'riteriafor Patentabi/iJ:y Under the EPC 
To be patentable under the EPC an invention must be new, involve an 
inventive step, 123 be capable of industrial application, 124 be sufficiently 
described in the disclosure, not relate to a discovery or a plant or animal 
variety and not be an essentially biologica] process. 
EPC Article 53(a) excludes from patentability inventions which would be 
contrary to "ordre public or morality". The Guidelines125 state that the 
purpose of these exclusions is to prevent the patenting of invent10ns likely 
to induce public disorder or riot, or to lead to generally offensive or 
criminal behaviour. The Guidelines state that a fair test to apply is to 
consider "whether it is probable that the general public would regard the 
invention as so abhorrent that the grant of patent rights would be 
inconceivable". A letter bomb is given as a possible example. 
C Patents on Genes and DNA 
Although a discovery per se is not patentable, 126 the practical application 
of it is. Therefore the discovery of a new gene will not be patentable per 
se, but if that gene is purified and/or isolated and a practical application 
123 
124 
125 
126 
------ -·· 
An invention will lack an inventive step if a person skilled in the art 
would have thought the idea worth trying, and would have a 
reasonab]e chance of success. In the lJK the test for 
obviousness/lack of an inventive step is that a skilled person 
would have thought that the idea was well worth trying in order to 
see whether it would have beneficial results: Johns-Manville 
Corporatzon's Patent [1967] RPC 479, cited with approval by the 
English Comt of Appeal in Genentech, below n 172. 
EPC art 52(1) provides that European patents sha11 be granted for 
inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which 
are new and which involve an inventive step. EPO Guideline -II, 
4.12 indicates that susceptible of industrial application is 
synonymous with "capable of industrial application". 
EPO Guidelines C-IV, 3.1-3.3. 
Article 53(2) of the EPC excludes discoveries from patentability. 
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for it is disclosed, then it may be patentable. The NIH and MRC patent 
applications led to much debate about the morality of patents on human 
genes, 127 but at present such applications have been allowed under the 
EPC as long as they meet the standard criteria for patentability. 
D Transgenic Animals 
Patents on transgenic animals have led to a heated debate on the morality 
of such patents, and some applications have been refused on this ground. 
Under EPC Article 53(b)128 plant and ammal variet.J.es, and essentially 
biological processes129 for the production of plants and animals, are 
excluded from patentability.130 Plant varieties are excluded from protection 
because many EPC states are members of the Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)131 which provides for the protection of 
plant breeders' nghts over plant varieties. The Convention also provides 
that the same plant variety or genus should not be a:ff orded both patent 
and plant breeders' rights protection. A transgenic animal will not be 
patentable if it relates to an animal variety, or is produced by an essentially 
biological process. UPOV does not cover animal varieties and so cannot 
be used to explam the reference to animal vaneties in Article 53(b ). 
A transgenic animal is likely to satisfy the novelty requirements of the EPC 
because while mice are found in nature, mice c.,arrying human genes are 
-- -·---
127 
128 
129 
130 
lJl 
See Part TI C below 
EPO Guidelines C-VI, 3.4-3.5. 
Traditional breeding methods would be classed as essentially 
biological processes and would not be patentable. For something 
to fall outside this exception there must be significant technical 
intervention: see above n 11. 
This provision is equivalent to section 3(b )Patents Act 1977 (UK). 
UPOV was established by the International Convention for the 
Protection ot New Varieties of Plants as revised in 1972 and 1978. 
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not. Likewise this will ensure that the transgeruc animal is not a discovery. 
Transgenic animals could potentially fall down at the inventive step hurdle. 
It will quickly become obvious to transfer useful genes between species. 
The sufficiency of the disclosure is potentially a problem for a transgenic 
animal patent. Rule 28 of the EPC requires a deposit of a sample of a 
relevant micro-organism which is not pubhcly available. Such deposits are 
recognised under the Budapest Treaty. 132 
Transgenic animals may be rejected under Article 53(a) as being contrary 
to morality. The precise shape of this morality objection can take a 
number of forms as demonstrated by the debate surrounding the Harvard 
Onco-mouse patent application. 
E 11te Harvard/Onco-mouse applicati.on in Europe 
The Harvard Onco-mouse is a transgenic animal which has a cancer 
causing gene (an "oncogene") inserted into its genome which causes it to 
develop cancers within a few months of birth. The animal is useful as a 
tool for the investigation of the causes and treatment of human cancer. 
The inventors applied to the EPO for a European patent on this animal. 
The Examining Division of the EPO rejected the Harvard Onco-mouse 
application.133 On appeal the Technical Board of Appeal set aside this 
decis10n and remitted the application to the Examining Division for further 
examination. 134 
The Examining Division applied the test of morality described above. 135 
1hat is was it probable that the general public would regard the 
132 
133 
134 
135 
Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of 
Micro-organisms (1977). 
OJ EPO 1989, 451. 
Tl9/90, Harvard/Onco-mouse, OJ EPO 1990, 476. 
Harvard/Onco-mouse OJ EPO 10/1992, 588; (1991] EPOR 525. 
43 
Onco-mouse as so abhorrent that the grant of patent rights would be 
inconceivable. They weighed the competing public interest considerations 
and held that overall the invention would reduce the amount of animal 
suffering and was not contrary to EPC Article 53(a). Animal suffering 
would be reduced because it was predicted that fewer animals would be 
used in conventional testing as a result of the Onco-mouse. The public 
benefit outweighed the risk to the environment and the harm to the 
animal. Mice are a higher taxonomic group than a variety and are hence 
not excluded from patentability by Article 53(b ). The patent was granted 
in October 1992, four years after the equivalent patent was granted in the 
US. It was the first granted for a transgenic animal by the EPO. 
Oppositions have been lodged agamst this patent by 16 parties. 136 The 
arguments of the opponents which follow illustrate a number of different 
moral positions: 
the Technical Board of Appeal (the Board) failed to sufficiently consider 
the suffering of the animal ( especially the suffering of an 
Onco-chimpanzee which was also included in the patent); 
the Board overrated the benefit of the invention; 
the Board underrated the environmental risks (if an Onco-dog were to 
escape and hreed with other normal dogs the results would be unpleasant); 
the balancing kst is not suitable to determine whether the invention was 
patentable under EPC Article 53(a) (the argument is that something 
inherently immoral cannot be made moral JUSt because it benefits 
humanity in some w~y, a moral balancing act is not appropriate for 
136 
---------
H Jaeruchen and A Schrell "'The Harvard Onco-mouse m the 
Opposition Proceedings before the European Patent Office" 
[1993] 9 EIPR 345. 
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something which is inherently immoral). This raises a fundamental 
question about the meaning of the morality provision. Is something moral 
if it can be justified in the interests of humanity or is it moral if it is not 
inherently wrong; 
the subject matter of the patent was an affront to the dignity of mankind; 
the patenting of a human oncogene is one step nearer to patenting the 
human genome an<l hern,t an affront to the dignity of mankind; 
general arguments about the unknown risks of genetic engineering; 
that parts of the patent related to the treatment of the animal body by 
therapy and was therefore not mdustrially applicable and were 
unpatentable under Articles 52(1) and 52(4); 
rehgious, political and moral doubts under Article 53(a); and denying a 
patent would discourage this type of research and hence protect public 
order. 
In February 1993 the Green group m the European Parliament put 
fotward an emergency motion which called for the revoking of the 
Onco-mouse patent by the EPO. This resolution was carried by a majority 
of 178 to 19 (with 27 abstentions), and declared the "resolute opposition" 
of the Parliament to the patent. 137 The outcome of the 
Harvard/Onco-mouse patent oppositions is still awaited. 
F After the Harvard mouse in Europe 
The Upjohn Application138 involved a hairless mouse used to test hair 
restorer. The mouse had been genetically modified to incorporate a 
----------
lJ7 
138 
EP Resolution B3-0I99, 0220,0249/93. 
Above n 11 , 32. 
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"reporter gene" which would signal the stimulation of hair growth by 
producing a readily measurable effect. One such effect was the 
development of cancer. The Examirung Division decided that the benefit 
to mankind was outweighed by the suffering caused to the animal and 
rejected the application on moral grounds.139 
In two recent decisions140 the EPO has confirmed the narrow 
interpretations that will be given to the exclusions under Article 53(a) and 
(b ). Hence animals and plants are not generally excluded from patent 
protection, but the EPO is prepared to reject some applications under the 
morality exclusion. 
G Methods of Medu:a/, Treatment 
Article 52(4)141 of the EPC provides that: 
Method:; for treatment of the human or animal body by :;urgery or therapy and 
diagnostic methods practised on the human or animal bodv shall not be 
regarded as mventions which arc susceptible of industrial application within the 
meanmg of paragraph 1. Thi,; provision shall not apply to products, in 
particular substances or compositions, for use in any of these methods. 
According to White142 this restraint on the patentability of certain types of 
pharmaceutical and veterinary inventions is a retrograde step having the 
effect of retarding the discovery of new remedies for many diseases. 
139 
140 
141 
142 
The equivalent application has been allowed in New Zealand in 
NZ Patent No. 231502. No controversy surrounded the granting 
of this patent and the Patent Office were not required to make 
public the reasons for its decision to grant this patent. 
Opposition to EP-Bl O 122 791 and opposition to EP-Bl O 242 
236; discussed in n 136 above, 34 7 
Equivalent to section 4(2) Patents Act 1977(UK). 
A White "The Patentability of Naturally Occurring Products" 
[1980] EIPR February, 37, 40. 
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Article 54( 5) relates to novelty requrrements and provides that the 
provisions of paragraphs ( 1) to ( 4) of Article 54 shall not exclude from 
patentability any substance or composition, comprised in the state of the 
art (ic a known compound), for use in a method referred to in Article 
52(4), provided that its use for any method referred to in Article 52(4) is 
not comprised in the state of the art (ie provided it has not been used in a 
method of treatment before). The consequence of this is that a first 
therapeutlc use of a known compound will have the requisite novelty to be 
patentable. 
This means that a use-bound-substance claim will be allowed, while the 
actual use of the substance in a method of medical treatment will not be 
patentable due to Article 52(4). This can be seen as a compromise 
position. Methods of treatment are not patentable, but it is desirable to 
encourage the discovery of medical uses for known substances. The 
inventor of a medical use for a known substance cannot patent the medical 
use, and cannot patent the substance itself because it is not new.143 As a 
compromise position the EPC has in effect relaxed the novelty 
requirements for the first medical use of a known substance by rendering 
it novel undet Article 54(5). 
Another means by which the inventor of a new medical use for a known 
compound can gain patent protection under the EPC is by the use of 
so-called "Swiss-type" claims. 144 A Swiss-type claim is in effect a claim to 
the method of manufacture of a medicament, whic:..h derives its novelty 
143 
144 
Tht. inventor of a new non-medical use for a known substance will 
be able to patent the new process, and so does not need the benefit 
of Article 54(5). 
An example of a Swiss-type claim is: "The use of substance (A) in 
the manufacture of a medicament (B) for the therapeutic and/or 
prophylactic treatment of a medical indication (C)." 
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from the new use. 145 Infringement of a Swiss-type claim catches the 
manufacturer and not the physician. Therefore such claims do not raise 
the same ethical issues that patents on methods of medical treatment do. 
XIII THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVE 
ON BIOTECHNOLOGY 
A '/he Emergence of Ethical. and Moral. Issues 
In 1988 the European Commission published a Proposal for a Council 
Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (the 
draft Directive). The Commission observed that within the Community 
"there is no other field of technology where national patent laws vary on 
so many points as they do in biotechnology" .146 There was concern that 
this made the European Union a less attractive place in which to invest in 
research and development in biotechnology, and that ground was being 
lost to Japan and the US which had more favourable patent regimes. 
In pursuit of a uniform, certain and liberal interpretation of the EPC in 
relation to biotechnology inventions, the Commission produced the draft 
Directive. 147 The original draft Directive did not mention moral and ethical 
considerations because the Commission did not consider them to be 
relevant. 148 
145 
146 
147 
148 
John Wyeth's and Schermg's Applicauons (1985] RPC 545. 
in this case some obiter comments were made to th<., eff cct that 
Swiss-type claims lacked novelty under the Patents Act 1949 (UK) 
on which the Patents Act 1953 was based. Based on this authonty 
the New Zealand patent office do not allow Swiss-type claims. 
R Whaite, N Jones "Biotechnological Patents in Europe - The 
Draft Directive" [19891 5 EIPR 145. 
Above n l l. 
N Jones "Biotechnological Patents in Europe - 1 Tpdate on the 
Draft Directive" [1992] 12 FIPR 455 456. 
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The European Parliament opposed the draft Directive on ethical and moral 
grounds. Patent protection on human genetic material became a 
controversial issue as did patents on transgenic animals. The continued 
exclusion of methods of medical treatment has raised little controversy. 
It appears that groups opposed to the Directive employed delaying tactics 
in the European Parliament.149 However, in October 1992 an amended 
draft Directive was adopted by 105 to 82 votes. 150 As a result of the 
opposition the draft Directive encountered in the European Parliament, 
moral and ethical issues were addressed in the amended draft Directive. 
In December 1993 the Council of Ministers reached political agreement 
on the draft Directive, and in January 1994 adopted, by a qualified 
majority, a "Common Position" on an amended draft Directive. It adopted 
some but not all of the European Parliament's amendments to the onginal 
draft Directive. 151 The Common Position was adopted by a qualified 
majority. Spain, Denmark Luxembourg and Italy all voted against the 
Common Position for ethical reasons. 152 The UK vote in favour was 
subject to the reservation that the draft Directive be examined by the UK 
Parliament, in particular the Laws and Institutions Subcommittee of the 
House of Lords. 
The patenting of arumal life per se was objected to by Denmark. 
Denmark also objects to the Common Position because of concerns that 
149 
150 
151 
There is a strong "green" lobby in Europe which believes that no 
living forms should be patentable. 
"Parliament Finally Gives OK to Biotech Patent Proposal" (1992) 
6 World Intellectual Property Report 329. 
"Onco-mouse Oppositions Filed as EC Grapples with 
Biotechnology Directive" (1993) 7 World Intellectual Property 
Report 62. 
S F aircliff e "Biotechnology Patent Directive Still Faces Ethical 
Objections" (1994) 8 World Intellectual Property Report 96. 
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the text of the draft Directive is not dear enough in limiting the possibility 
of obtaining patents on the human body. The Danes also appear to be 
concerned about gene therapy patents due to the unknown future of gene 
therapy and the consequences of patenting such technology. 153 Spain took 
the view that all processes for human gene therapy should be 
unpatentable. Spain also c.ons1dcred that the test of whether a form of 
gene therapy was contrary to human dignity or not would be impossible 
apply. Luxembourg agreed with the ob1ect10ns ratsed by Spam and 
Denmark. 154 
B The Common Positron 
1 The provisions of the Common Posi,li,on 
Article 2 of the Common Position makes it clear that patents may be 
obtained on plants and animals. 
Article 2. 3 provides that inventions, the publicat:J.on or expl01tation of 
which would be contraty to public policy or morality, shall be 
unpatentable. This is virtually identical to EPC Article 53(a), except it uses 
the phrase "public policy" instead of "ordre public".155 Paragraphs 2.3(a), 
(b) and ( c) list specific exclusions considered to be contrary to public 
policy or morality. 
153 
154 
155 
Above n 152. 
M Moynihan "The Europ1,an Biote h Directive - an End in 
Sight?" Patent World, April l 994. 24. 
The significance of thts change of wordmg will be open to debate 
and may create uncertainty over the continued relevance of 
precedents decided under the different wording of EPC Article 
53(a). Considering that the ann of the Drrect:J.ve 1s to increase the 
certainty and uniformity of Community patent law this change 
of wording in the main morality clause may be unwise. 
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Under Article 2.3(a) "the human body or parts of the human body as 
such", are not patentable. Under ArticJe 2.3(b) "processes for modifying 
the genetic identity of the human body contrary to the dignity of man" are 
unpatentable. These two provisions appear to contemplate an absolute 
prohibition from patentability of inventions which fall within them. 
"[P]rocesses for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely 
to cause them suffering or physical handicaps without any substantial 
benefit to man or animal, and animals resulting from such processes" are 
excluded from patentability by Article 2.3( c ). The benefit to man or 
animal must be "substantial". If the benefit is substantial it would seem 
that the suffering to the animal need not be considered at all. This Article 
may be viewed as a partial ban on patenting transgenic animals. 
Recital 15 states that an invention involving the genetic modification of 
animals will be unpatentable where the suffering or physical handicaps 
inflicted on the animal is out of proportion to the objective pursued. This. 
involves using a balancing test as used in the Harvard Onco-mouse and 
Upjohn decisions of the EPO. According to the recital even an invention 
with laudable aims may cause an unnecessary degree of suffering. Recital 
15 requires the suffering of the animal to be taken into account. In 
employing a balancing test paragraph 2.3(c) is different from paragraphs 
2.3(a) and (b). 
Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 2.3 have been criticised for not 
givmg adequate guidance as to how they should be interpreted. 156 For 
example there is no guidance on what is meant by "contrary to the dignity 
of man" as used in Article 2.3(b ). Article 2.3 of the Common Position, 
together with the exclusion of methods of medical treatment from 
1~6 R Nott "The Proposed EC Directive on Biotechnological 
Inventions" f1 994] 5 EIPR 191, 192. 
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patentability under Article 52( 4) of the EPC, indicate the willingness in 
Europe to tackle the difficult moral issues raised by new technologies as a 
part ot patent law. 
2 Genes and DNA under the Gommon Positum 
It is proposed that the human body or parts of the human body per se 
should be unpatentable as being contrary to public policy or morality. 157 
This raises the question what is a part of the human body? For example 
are rrucroscoptc parts, such as human genes, included within this 
definition? Recital 10 states that ownership of human beings is immoral. 
and that consequently a patent cannot be granted over the human body or 
parts of the human body as such. This includes a human gene, protein or 
cell in the natural state of the human body "as found inside the human 
body", including germ cells and products resulting directly from 
conception If genes, proteins or cells are isolated from the body, they may 
be patentable. 158 
.~ Transgenic Animals under the Gommon Posi.ti.on 
Article 2.3 of the Common Position provides that inventions arc not to be 
considered to be patentable where publication or exploitation of them 
would be contrary to public policy or morality. 
Concerns have been raised about the possibility of patenting human 
beings. There seems to be a consensus that this should not be allowed. 
Articles 2.3(a) exdudes patents on the human body or parts of the human 
body. This should also exclude patents on transgenic humans. Such 
15 7 
B8 
Article 2.3( a) of the Common Position on the draft Directive. 
J Thurston "Recent EC Developments in Biotechnology" [1993] 6 
EIPR 187. 
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patents are also likely to fall foul of Article 2.3(b) as being "contrary to the 
dignity of man" and possibly also Article 2. 3( c ). 
Article 3 provides that biological material, including transgenic animals, is 
patentable. However, under Article 2.3(c) processes for modifying the 
genetic identity of animals which are likely to inflict suffering or physical 
handicaps on them without any benefit to man or animal are to be 
unpatentable. 159 Recital 15 indicates that the suffering or physical 
handicaps inflicted on the animal is to be balanced against the benefits of 
the objective pursued. The European Parliament has resisted the 
arguments of those who say that animal welfare considerations should be 
addressed in laws specifically directed towards that purpose, and have no 
place in patent law. 
4 Methods of Met/i,cal Treatment under the Common Posi.ion 
Methods of medical treatment are not generally patentable under the EPC 
and did not need to be dealt with specifically by the draft Directive.' 
However, the draft Directive does contain provisions relevant to the new 
area of gene therapy. Article 2.3(h) excludes from patentability any 
process which modifies the genetic identity of the human body for a 
non-therapeutic purpose which is contrary to the dignity of man. Some 
commentators are critical of introducing concepts such as "the dignity of 
man" into patent law.160 
Since its first publication with no reference to moral considerations in 
1988 the draft Directive has evolved to a position where in 1994 it 
mcorporates sigruficant provision for the consideration of moral issues. 
--------------
159 
160 
This provision is intended to prevent patents on animals such as 
the "Beltsville pig": see above n 35 and n 150. 
Above n 158. 
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The European Parliament seems to be determined to ensure that moral 
issues are not shut out of patent law. 
C The European Parliament's Response to the Common Posi..ion 
The Common Position has been referred back to the European 
Parliament, which referred it to a Committee for consideration in March 
1994. This Commtttee has proposed significant changes to the Common 
Position. They propose that there be an absolute ban on patenting human 
genes and gene therapies. 161 The Commtttee also propose a farmers 
privilege which includes geneticaJly engineered livestock. The future of the 
draft Directive may not be settled until 1995 or later. 162 
D Criti.cisms of the Common Positi.on on the draft Directn,e 
According to Nott the morality and ordre publzclpublic policy obJections 
to patentability are so great a burden on the EPO, and to business, that 
they should be rejected. 163 However, this argument sounds a bit like saying 
crime is proving to be such a burden on the police, the courts and our 
prison system that we should stop trying to detect criminals. There may be 
something to this argument but clearly the real issues are much more 
complex than this analysts would suggest. Nott makes the standard 
argument of those opposed to morality clauses in patent law:164 
161 
162 
163 
164 
The way 111 which the problem of animal suffenng should be addressed 1s by 
the mdividual Member States relymg on their own laws specifically directed to 
the protection of animals and the control of the development and release of 
Wldesirable arumals and plants Patents cannot control matenal which is not 
bove n 1 56, 194 
R Nott "The European Biotech Directive-An End In Sight? 
(Repnse)" Patent World, September 1994, 5,6. 
Above n 156. 
Above n 156, 192. 
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both the subJect of the mvention and patented, but it is imperative that nature 
and the envrronment should be appropnately protected from undesirable 
genetic manipulation. 11tis can only be done effectively by laws directed 
specifically to the problems, and not by laws which touch only patented 
mventJons and nothing else 
Nott wishes to see the patent system operate in a vacuum, isolated from 
any value other than the encouragement of innovation. This argument 
does not consider the possibility that patent laws can play a role as a part 
of the wider overall regulation of areas of social concern. For example, the 
patent system alone cannot address the concerns society has for 
safeguarding animal welfare. However, the patent system can play a role 
as a part of a wider system of regulation, which includes specific animal 
welfare laws, as well as laws in some peripheral areas, such as patent law, 
which can also unpact upon animal welfare. Nott also ignores the issues 
concerning whether granting property rights in some inventions would be 
contrary to human dignity. 
In January 1994 the Laws and Institutions Subcommittee (Subcommittee 
E)165 of the House of Lords took evidence on the Common Position. The 
Subcommittee supported the attempt in the Common Position to expand 
the use of ethical criteria in deciding whether biotechnology inventions 
should receive patent protection. 166 However, it was opposed to denying 
patents for gene therapy techniques considered to be "contrary to the 
dignity of man" on the grounds that such a test would be very difficult to 
apply. The Subcommitlee believed that the issues raised by these 
165 
166 
A Subcommittee of the Select Committee on the European 
Communities 
"I · rds panel backs ethical baniers to biotech patents" (1994) 368 
Nature 278. 
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techniques should be debated in the wider medical and ethical context. 167 
The British B10technology Group are concerned about mcreasmg the role 
of ethical considerations in patent law. 168 First, they say that such 
considerations may reduce the competitiveness of the European 
biotechnology industry compared to other countries, such as the US, 
which do not have the same restrictions. This argument seems to be saying 
that any moral concerns should be cast aside in the mterests of improving 
the competitiveness of the European biotechnology industry. Such an 
argument may have some merit if, and only if, it can be demonstrated, or 
at least persuasively argued, that the benefits of such a regime for society 
outweigh the costs. The British Biotechnology Group make no such 
supporting arguments. 
Secondly, the British Biotechnology Crroup argue that the morality 
provisions place an unfair bm den on patent officers by requiring them to 
make ethical judgements. The EPO itself has not complained about this 
unfair burden on examiners, so presumably this argument can be 
dtscounted. Thirdl , the British B10technology Group is concerned that 
the draft Directive will be mterpreted dt:ff erently m different European 
nations. Even though one of the avowed purposes of the draft Directive is 
to harmonise Community biotechnology patent law. fhc interpretation of 
morality is likely to vary from one country to another. This would appear 
to be a valid but not insurmountable concern. 169 
167 
168 
169 
A view echoed by Cooke .T m the Wei/come case (above n 112) 
where he said at page 191 "tht question wh<; lher medical and 
surgical devices should be treated as a special subject in patent law 
... [is] ... a question upon which the views of medical professional 
bodies would seem to be among those deserving of consultation". 
Above n 166. . 
This concern can be addressed by provisions such ass 91(1) of the 
Patents Act 1977 (UK) which requires the UK Courts to take 
judicial notice of European Court decisions in order to achieve the 
confonruty required by s 130(7). 
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In summary the EPC and the Common Position (if it proceeds in its 
present form) indicate that the European Union considers it to be 
appropriate and necessary to tackle the moral and ethical problems raised 
by biotechnological inventions as a part of patent Jaw. This view has met 
with support from a House of Lords Subcommittee. In short moral and 
ethical issues are considered to have a place in patent law in Europe. 
XIV EXCLUSIONS ON MORAL GROUNDS IN THE UK 
A 1he Patents Act 1977 (UK) 
The Patents Act 1977 (UK) brought UK law close to the European Patent 
Convention. Under section 1(3)(a) patents are not to be granted for 
inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be generally 
expected to encourage offensive, immoral or anti-social behaviour. It has 
been suggested that the test to apply under subsection 3(a) is "whether use 
of the invention would offend moral principles of right trunking members 
of the public, such that it would be wrong for the law to protect it" . 170 A· 
similar principle has been applied to the registrability of designs. 171 
B Genes and DNA 
Patents have been granted on human genes and DNA in the UK. The 
morality of such patents has not been questioned by the UK Patent Office. 
However, DNA and gene patents are vulnerable on other grounds. In 
Genentech Inc & Another v Wei/come Jloundatzon Ltd m the English 
Court of Appeal considered the patentability of an amino acid and DNA 
sequence. The Court held that the patent was invalid on the ground that it 
170 
171 
l Tl 
---------- -
The Chartered Institute of Patent Agents ('.!.P.A. Guide to the 
Patents Acts (3 ed, Fourth Cumulative Supplement, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1993) 4. 
Above n 64. 
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was obvious to a person skilled in the art and lacked novelty. 173 If gene 
patent applie,ations bewme more vulnerable on the grounds of 
obV1ousncss and novelty then the unportance or relevance of moral 
arguments for their exclusion may be lessened or removed. 
C Transgenic Animals 
fhe position in the UK is similar to that under the EPC. Under section 
1 (3 )(b) patent,;; are not to he granted for any variety of animal or plant or 
any essentially biological process for the production of arumals or plants, 
not being a microbiological process or the product of such a process. 
Patents can be obtained for taxonomic groups other than varieties. 
Applications are subject to a morality test under section 1(3)(a). 
D Methods of,~et.ical Treatment 
In 1970 the Banks Committet- Report on the British Patent System174 
stated that the courts had consistently expressed the view that a process for 
the medical treatment of a human being was not patentable. The Banks 
Committee Report did not recommend that patent protection be extended 
to such methods. Consequently the Patents Act 1977 (UK), which 
generally gave effect to the Banks Committee Report, contains a specific 
exclusion for methods of treatment. 
The position with regard to the patentability of methods of medical 
treatment is virtually identical to that under the EPC described above. 175 
Falconer and Whitford JJ have given as the purpose of the exclusion of 
17.l 
174 
S Hird and M Peeters "Ll;,.. Protect10n for Recombinant DNA -
Exploring the Options" f] 991] 9 EIPR 334: M Cohn and I Cohn 
"Some reflections on the patentability of biotechnological 
inventions" Patent World, October 1991, 34. 
Cmnd 4407, paras 237-240, p 67. 
See Part ).JI G above. 
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methods of medical treatment fr m patentability as being "to ensure that 
the use in practice of such methods of medical treatment in treating 
patients should not be subjected to possible restraint or restriction by 
reason of any patent monopoly. "176 
XV MORALITY AND U.S. PATENT LAW 
In the US a strikingly different approach has been taken to the role of 
morality and ethics in patent law than has been the case in Europe. With 
some exceptions, the 1 TS PTO and courts have not considered ethical and 
moral concerns to be relevant to their determinations of patentable 
subject-matter. 
A U. S. Patent Law 
The US Constitution grants Congress broad power to "promote the 
Progress of Scicnc.e and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Wntmgs and . 
Discoveries" m The US Patent Act 1952 (35 USC section 101) defines as 
patentable "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof ... ". 
B Genes and DNA: the NIH and MRC applicati.ons 
The US government has recogrused the ethical tSsues raised by the Human 
Genome Project by allocating US$7 million a year for research on the 
1"'6 
177 
Above n 145, 565 
ArticJe I, sec 8, cl 8, Constitution of the United States. 
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ethics of genome research. 178 In 1992 the Congressional Office of 
Technology launched a study on the propriety of patents on genes. The 
debate about the appropriateness and morality of patents on human genes 
was intensified when the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) applied 
for patents on hundreds of fragments of human genes. 
The NIH is participating in the international research effort known as the 
Human Genome Project. 179 In 1991 the NIH applied for patents on 
several hundred 180 partial and complementary DNA sequences, known as 
expressed sequence tags (EST's). The function of these sequences was not 
known. These sequences are fragments of larger genes, which code for a 
particular protein. Some of these fragments could eventually tum out to 
cover valuable products. The application also claimed the whole gene of 
which the EST was a part, and the proteins for which they coded. 
If the NIH application had succeeded it could have resulted m somethmg 
of a "gold rush" with biotechnology companies racing to sequence and 
patent random segments of the human genome until it was all accounted 
178 
179 
180 
C Anderson "Genome Project Goes Commercial" (1993) 259 
Science 302: The study would appear to have been started as a 
part of a deal with Senator Edward Kennedy who had proposed a 
two year moratorium on gene patents. The US Department of 
Energy has supported the adoption of a new mode] for the 
protection of genes. lhe model involves restricting patent 
protection to known uses, thus avoiding the problem of the 
ownership of genes. 
See Part ill B above. 
Through the use of the continuation-in-part procedure available 
under US patent law the NU-I application expanded to include 
several thousand sequences, representing 5-15 % of the entire 
human genome 
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for. 181 The holders of the EST patents could then exercise a stranglehold 
over the biotechnology industry. 182 
The NIH application provoked world-,vide criticism from scientists.183 
James Watson, head of the NJH HGP, described the application as "sheer 
lunacy" and resigned in protest. 184 He felt that the patenting of the ESTs 
would hinder the free flow of information which was a central part of the 
HGP. This is an argument with an ethical dimension, ie the ethics of the 
methodology of scientific research and the free exchange of information in 
the acaderruc commuruty. trance is participating in the HGP and the 
French Minister fo1 Research and Technology, Hubert Curien, said that 
patentmg the human genome was ethically unacceptable and a "patent 
should not be granted for something that is part of our universal 
heritage" .185 
In response to the NlH application the UK Medical Research Council 
(MRC) reluctantly applied for patents on 1,100 sequences of human DNA 
it had isolated as a part of the HGP.186 In August 1992 the US PTO issued 
an Office Action which raised two substantive objections against the NIH 
181 
182 
183 
184 
18~ 
186 
This gold rush may already have begun. It has been estimated that 
by 1995 50-60% of the expressed portion of the human genome 
will have been revealed as EST's: K Mura<.;hige "The NIH gene 
application's fate at the US PTO" (1993) Patent World, October, 
15. 
R S Eisenberg "Genes, Patents and Product Development" (1992) 
257 Science 903. 
Above n 5, 32. 
ML McGregor "The NlH Patent Dispute: In Brief' (1992) 11 
Biotechnology Law Report 127. James Watson discovered the 
double helical structure of DNA in collaboration with Francis 
Crick m the 1950s, for which he won a Nobel pnze. 
Letter to Science, (1991) 254 Science 1710. 
P Aldhous "MRC follows NlH on patents' (1992) 356 Nature 98. 
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application. 187 First, the utility of the ESTs was said to be inadequate and 
vague. Secondly, some of the claimed sequences overlapped with 
previously published sequences. It was said that it would be obvious to a 
person skilled in the art to use the published sequences as probes to obtain 
lengths of DNA identical to those claimed. No moral or ethical objections 
were raised in the Office Actlon. 
The NTIJ application was most vulnerable on the ground that it was 
obvious. The NIH had done what would be obvious to a person skilled in 
the art. The obV1ousness of the work is demonstrated by the fact that other 
research teams are using the same technology as the NIH to the same 
ends. 
In February 1994 the NIH and the MRC agreed to withdraw their 
respective gene fragment applications. The Director of the NIH said that 
"I do not believe that patenting at this stage promotes technology 
development, and it may impede important research collaborations here 
and internationally" .188 Private companies are still understood to have 
outstanding applications for EST patents.189 
187 
188 
189 
"Top I-Il-IS Lawyer Seeks to Block NIH" (1992) 258 Science, 9 
October, 209. 
"Applications for gene patents 'thrown on bonfire' " (1994) 141 
New Scientist 4. 
"NIH to Appeal Patent Decision" (1993) 259 Science 302. 
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C Transgeni.c A~· 
1 Diamond v Chakrabarty 
The decision of the US Supreme Court in Diamond v Chakrabarty190 has 
had far reaching consequences for the biotechnology industry in the US. 191 
In Chakrabarty the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a living 
human-made bacterium, which was capable of degrading crude oil, was 
patentable subject matter. The Patent Office Board of Appeals had 
affirmed the patent examiners rejection of the application on the ground 
that living things were not patentable subject matter under section 101. 
This decision was reversed by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 
The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks appealed to the Supreme 
Comt. The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals dec1s10n by a 5 to 4 maJority. The Supreme Court considered that 
the Question before them was a narrow one of statutory interpretation 
which required them to construe the section 101 definition of patentable 
subject matter. Did the bacterium under consideration constitute a 
"manufacture" or "composition of matter" within section 101? fhese 
phrases were to be given their ordinary mearung192 and the Court was not 
to read into patent law limitations which the legislature had not expressed. 
By using broad language in section 101 it was clear that Congress 
contemplated that patent laws would be given a broad scope. The majority 
had no difficulty in bringing a living human-made bacterium within this 
190 
192 
477 U.S. 303 (1980). 
The decision in Diamondv Chakrabartv led to a flood of 
biotechnology apphcattons at the US PTO. In 1978 only 30 
b10technology applications were filed, compared to 11, OOO in 
1991: G R Peterson ed Understanding Biotechnology Law 
(Marcel Dekker Inc, New York, 1993) 8. 
This approach is the opposite to that which has developed in 
Commonwealth courts to the interpretation of the words "manner 
of new manufacture": see for example above n 93 and 112. 
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broad scope, the bacterium was a "non-naturally occurring manufacture or 
compos1t10n ot matter - a product of human ingenuity" .193 
For the Commissioner it was argued that the enactment of the 1930 Plant 
Protection Act and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act mdicated that 
Congress did not consider living matter to be otherwise within section 101. 
These Acts extended patent protection to certain plants and specifically 
excluded bacteria. If living matter had already been patentable under 
section 101 it was argued that these two Acts were unnecessary. The 
majority n,jt-cted this argument by holding that these Acts were passed to 
prevent the rigid application of the "products of nature" doctrine and 
disclosure requirements, which would prevent the patenting of artificially 
bred plants, and not becam;e living matter was regarded as being 
unpatentable. 
A second argument presented for the Commissioner was that Congress 
did not have living organisms in mind when it enacted the patent laws. 
The Court noted that it was in the nature of the patent system that 
applications would be made for unforeseen inventions. This view must be 
correct. However, the Court went on to say that it could not address issues 
related to the morahty of such patents (for example whether they might 
depreciate the value of human life). The majority declared themselves 
"without competence to entertain these arguments"194 of high policy which 
were for the legislature to resolve. These arguments involved "the 
balancing of competing values and interests"195 which was the business of 
elected representatives. This is a strange view for a court to take, since the 
life-blood of courts is the balancing of competing values and interests. By 
deciding that their task was a narrow one of statutory interpretation one 1s 
193 
JQ4 
195 
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Above n 190, 150 
<\hove n 190, 155. 
Above n 190, 155. 
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left with the foeling thai the Supreme Court avoided facing up to the 
moral issues raised by patents on living matter. 
The dissenting minority believed that the 1930 Plant Protection Act and 
the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act were strong evidence that Congress 
did not consider living organisms to be generally patentable under section 
101. Otherwise these Acts would, in their view, have been unnecessary. 
The majority were extending the area of patentability to include living 
matter even though Congress plainly believed this to be unpatentable when 
it enacted the 1930 and 1970 Acts. This was not the proper role of the 
Court m this area of uruque public concern. If the minority view is correct 
then the majority in fact adopted the converuent approach of extending the 
scope of patentability to living matter while at the same time absolving 
themselves of any responsibility for addressing the public policy and 
morality issues involved. They disguised this manoeuvre by claiming to be 
addressing a narrow issue of statutory interpretation. 
Although the Court in Chakrabarty said that "anything under the sun ... 
that is made by man" was proper subject matter for a patent, 196 the 
decision must be restncted by the facts of the case. Chakrabarty is only 
authority for the proposition that living single-celled bacteria are patentable 
in the US. The decision in Chakrabarty was made by the narrowest of 
margins. It may represent the high-water mark from which subsequent 
decisions will retreat. 
The US PTO have acted upon the Chakrabarty decision by granting 
patents on higher organisms. Issuing such patents has become the practice 
of the US PTO, however, whether the courts will ultimately support this 
196 
One exception from patentability was human beings, as the US 
Constitution prohibits slavery: Amendment XIII (1865). In New 
Zealand slavef} is on offence under section 98 of the Crimes Act 
1961. 
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practice remains to be seen.197 US courts have in the past considered 
moral issues to be relevant in determining patentable subject matter and 
they could do so again. 198 
In 1985 the US PTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ruled that 
plants, seeds and plant tissue were patentable subject matter. 199 In 1987 
the same Board in R'< parte Allen, 200 relying on Chakrabarty, determined 
that a multicellular organism, in that case an oyster, was patentable.201 In 
April 1987, shortly after the Ex parte Allen decision_ the Commissioner of 
Patents and Trademarks issued a Notice stating:202 
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally occurring 
non-human multicellular hvmg organisms, mcludmg animals, to be patentable 
subject matter within the scope of 35 USC s l O 1 
The Board of Patent Appeal,;; and Interferences is a branch of the PTO, 
which is itself an administrative agency of the federal government. 
Therefore the decisions of the Board (such as that m Ex parte Allen), and 
the Notice issued by the Commissioner, are not binding on US courts 
faced with the same issue. A court decision could still reverse the position 
taken by the PTO on the patenting of mult1cellular organisms. As 
Chakrabarty was concerned with a single-celled bacterium it is not 
binding authority for the view that multicellular organisms are patentable 
197 
198 
199 
200 
201 
202 
R Annitage "The Emerging US Patent Law for the Protection of 
Biotechnology Research Results" [1989] 2 EIPR 47 
Lawellv Lewrs 15 F.Cas. 1018 (CCD 11ass 1817) (No. 8568); 
Reliance Noveltv Corp v Dwor:zek 80 F. 902, 904 (ND 
Cal.1897). 
Ex parte Hibberd 227 USPQ 443 (PTO Ed.Pat.App.& Int.1985). 
2 USPQ 2d 1425 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987). 
Although the apphcat10n m tlus case was rejected on the ground of 
obviousness. 
US PTO Official Gazette 1077 OG 24 ( 1987). 
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The decision in Ex parte Allen and the Notice were adverse]v cnticised by 
farm, church and arumal welfare groups. 203 Groups representing farmers 
were concerned that large biotechnology corporations would gain control 
over the sales of superior patented livestock. Church groups believed that 
genetically engineering animals was immoral and interfered with God's 
work. Animal welfare groups felt that the granting of patents on 
genetically engineered animals was immoral because they would 
encourage more animal experiments and suffering. 
2 Animal Legal, Defense Fund v Quigg 
In Animal Legal Defense Fund v Quigi04 a coalition of 6 animal welfare 
groups, two individual farmers and a farmers organisation, challenged the 
legality of the PTO Notice on administrative law principles. They sought 
to have 1t declared void. 
The Federal Circuit Court dismissed the case on the ground that the 
plaintiffs did not have standing to sue. 205 In US patent law there is no 
opporturuty for pre-grant opposition and the Court was not prepared to 
create such a right by granting the plaintiffs standing. The problems the 
applicants faced in gaining standing are in contrast to the greater 
opportunities for interested parties to oppose patents under the EPC206 and 
in New Zealand. 207 
203 
204 
20~ 
206 
1.07 
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D Kell "The Furore over the Patenting of Animals: Anzmal Legal 
Defense Fundv Quigg" [1992] 8 EIPR 279. 
710 F.Supp 728 (DC' N. Calif. 1989); appeal transferred: 900 
F 2d 195 (9th Cir 1990); 932 F,2d 920 (Fed.Cir. 1991). 
For a detailed discussion of why the plaintiffa were refused 
standing see above n 203, 281. 
EPC Article 99. 
Patents Act 1953 sections 21 and 41. 
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Since the pJaintiffs never established standing the Court did not have to 
consider the question of whether the interpretation of section 101 
contained in the Notice was correct. In effect the absence of pre-grant 
opposition procedures, and the difficulties interest groups face in obtaining 
standing, are further examples of how the US patent system is shutting out 
moral arguments. An authoritative court ruling on the patentability of 
multicellular animals in the US may not occur until a case arises out of an 
infringement action mvolving an arumal patent, in which the defendant 
challenges as being unpatentable the subject matter of the plaintiffs patent. 
3 Events after the 1Voace 
In April 1988 the US PTO granted the first US patent for a higher 
organism, for the so-called Hatvard On co-mouse. 208 The same animal 
patent that was to meet such resistance m Europe.~ i 
No further transgenic animal patents were issued by the US PTO for four 
years.110 This deJay was not due to any shortage of applications as over 
100 such applicat10ns were pendmg. These applications were stalled while 
the US PTO considered the political implications. m In December 1992 
the US PTO issued three further transgenic animal patents.212 All three 
related to strains of mice. m 
208 
209 
210 
211 
11.l 
213 
Although the patent is generally described as being for a mouse 
US Patent No. 4 736866 is directed towards an) non-human 
mammal genetically modified in the manner disclosed. 
See Part XIl E above. 
"US PTO breaks logjam on animal patents with three transgenic 
rruce" Patent World, February 1993, 12. 
Above n 32. 
US 5175383, {)S 5175384 and US 5175385. 
The mouse of US 517383 develops benign prostatic hyperplasia, 
the mouse of US 5175384 has a defective immune system, while 
the mouse of US 5175385 produces increased amounts of 
interferon and has higher resistance to viral infections. 
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Transgenic animal patents are being granted in the US apparently without 
the application of any kind of morality test. However, voices of opposition 
have raised moral arguments against such patents in Congress214 and the 
courts. 
D Af ethods of Medi.ea/ Treatment 
In an 1883 application the CS Patent Office rejected claims to surgical 
instmments for the treatment of haemorrhoids, on the grounds that 
methods of treatment of disease were not patentable.215 This decision was 
ovenuled in 1942. 216 In 1954 in Bx parte Scherer, 217 the US Patent Office 
Board of Appeals issued a statement that medical or surgical methods 
were patentable. Such methods are a "process" within section 101. 
According to White since the decision in Ex parte Scherer many such 
patents have been issued m the US, with no apparent ill effects or public 
outcry.218 Others have noted that patents for exclusively medical 
treatments (ie patents for medical processes which are not conjoined with 
a dmg or medical device) remain relatively uncommon in the US.219 
Between 1975 and 1984 at least twenty-eight patents were granted in the 
US for medical processes wJuch were not related to a new drug or 
device. 220 
214 
215 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 
------- -
A Watts "A Matter of Lite and Patents" (1991) 129 New ~cientist 
41: Between 1988 and 1991 at least eight Bills on patenting 
animals were introduced into the Congress. 
Bx parte Brinkerhof 24 Ms. Dec. 349 (P.O. Comm. 1883). JPOS 
Vol.27, p. 797 (1945). 
r'anadian-American Pharmaceutical Co. v Coe 126 F.2d 847 
(1942). 
103 USPQ 107. 
Above n 31. 
T J McCoy "Biomedical Process Patents: Should Thev be 
Restricted by Ethical Limitations?" (1992) 13 J Legal Medicine 
501, 508. 
G F Burch "Ethical Considerations in the Patenting of Medical 
Processes" (1987) 65 Texas Law Review 1139. 
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The US courts and the US PTO have in recent years consistently refused 
to consider moral or ethical i~sues as a part of the patent system. The US 
approach has involved a mechanical application of the patent statute. 
However, there have been dissenting voices from some members of 
Congress221 and public interest groups. 222 The absence of a court ruling 
specifically on the patentability of higher organisms means that this issue 
cannot be taken as having been finally settled even in the US. 
XVI EXCLUSIONS PERMITTED BY INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) has been 
described as a major breakthrough in the international protection of 
intellectual property.m According to GATT-TRIPS to be patentable an 
invention must be new, capable of industrial application, and involve an 
inventive step.224 The Agreement allows, but does not require, exclusions 
for diagnostic and therapeutic methods (but not pharmaceuticals) for the 
treatment of animals or humans, animals and plants, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of animals and plants. 
Under Article 27(2) Members may exclude from patentability "inventions, 
the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of 
which ts necessary to protect ordre public or morality." This includes 
protecting human, animal or plant life or health and avoiding serious 
221 
222 
223 
224 
"Hat.held Introduces Bill Mandating 2-Year Moratonum on 
.Animal Paknts - Human c~lls, Tissues, and fluids Also Covered" 
(1993) 12 Biotechnology J.aw Report 249· M J Lane "Patenting 
Life: Responses of Patent Offices in the l Sand Abroad" (1991) 
32 Jurimetrics Journal 89. 
Above n 34. 
J Worthy "Intellectual Property Protection After GATT" f1994] 5 
EIPR 195. 
Article 27(1 ). 
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prL:JUdice to the enviromnent. Under Article 27(3) Members may also 
exclude from patentabitity diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans or animals, and plants and animals other than 
micro-organisms. 
DNA, genes, transgenic animals and methods of medical treatment could 
all be denied patents in indivtdual cases on the traditional patentability 
grounds included in Article 27(1). Gene and DNA patent1; are also 
potentially excluded from patcntability lUlder Article 27(2) if such patents 
were considered to be contrary to morality. 
Signatories are allowed to exclude transgenic animals from patentability 
under Article 27(2) and/or 27(3)(b). Methods of medical treatment may 
be excluded under Article 27(2) and/or Article 27(3)(a). 
The G.\TT TRIPS Agreement makes ample provision for the 
consideration of ethical and moral issues in patent law. GATT TRIPS 
does not require New Zeal.u1J to exclude ethical and moral considerations 
from its patent law. 
The World Intellectual Property Organisation225 (WIPO) produced a Draft 
Patent Law Treaty in 1984, with the atm of harmonising world patent 
law.226 Agreement on what, rt any, exclusions should be allowed under the 
WIPO Draft Patent Law Treaty has not yet been reached.127 
115 
226 
227 
'\.n agency of the l Tnited Nations 
lI C Wegner Patent Harmonzsatzon (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
1993). 
Above n 22, 9. 
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XVII EXCLUSIONS ON MORAL GROUNDS IN 
NEW ZEALAND 
A Sec.ion 17 Patents Act 1953 
Under section 17(1)(b) of the Act, inventions the use of which would be 
contrary to law or morality, may be refused by the Commissioner of 
Patents. 
B Secti.on 6 of the Statute of Monopolies 
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies forms part of the definition of an 
invention in New Zealand. 228 Section 6 contains three limitations on 
patcntability. Patents must not be: contrary to the law; mischievous to the 
State by raising prices of commodities at home or hurt trade; or be 
generally inconvenient. 
C Genes· and DNA 
Applications to patent genes and DNA may he declined because they 
relate to a discovery and are therefore not an invention. DN sequences 
which have been modified or created by human manipulation will not be a 
discovery. If naturally occuning DNA or genes have been isolated and/or 
purified and have a commercial use, then this may bring them within the 
deftmtton oi invention. DNA sequences are commonly granted patents in 
New Zealand. In 1990 the .<\ssistant Commissioner of Patents set out 
some of the criteria for the granting of patents on DNA sequences:229 
228 
229 
---------
See Part IV above. 
KB Popplewell, Assistant Commissioner of Patents, "Protein 
Sequences" 13 June 1990. 
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Clanns to protem [ar.d DNA] "sequences" arc therefore allowable provided 
that a method for their production is disclosed, the claim 1s fairly based, and 
the product 1s defined sufficiently for a skilled addressee to be certam that he 
or she has the claimed product. Examples of"sequence" clanns which may be 
allowed are· "A DNA sequence coding for (a well defined substance)" 
Section 10(7) of the Act provides that claims to a new substance found in 
nature shall be construed as excluding that substance when found in 
nature. In practice the patent office require claims to explicitly exclude the 
substance when found in nature.230 Moral arguments do not appear to 
have been raised to try to exclude patents on human genes or DNA in 
New Zealand. 
D Transgenic Animals 
The New Zealand patent office have granted patents on microorganisms 
smce at least 1970, m and have now allowed patents on genetically 
modified plants and higher animals. 232 There has been no suggestion that 
the patent office have considered refusing applications on moral grounds. 
E Methods of Medical, Treatment 
In the H ellcome l...tSC the 1 ·e Zealand Cout1 of Appeal confirmed that 
methods for the mt;;dical treatment of human beings were not patentable. 
fhe Court decided that for ethical reasons a method of medical treatment 
was not the proper subject of letters patent according to the principles 
LJO 
231 
232 
KB Popplewell Assistant Commissioner of Patents. "Naturally 
Occumng :Micro-organisms" Memorandum 2 April 1991. 
NZ Patent Office Ruling "Patentability of Micro-organisms" 
H. Burton, Assistant Commissioner of Patents, 6 October 1980. 
NZ Patent Number 231502 Transgenic Mammals for the Analysis 
of Hair Growth (1987); NZ Patent Number 224576 Herbicide 
Resistant Crop Plants (1988). 
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which have been developed by the courts for the application of section 6 
of the Statute of Monopolies. 
However, there have been suggestions that the exclusion might now be 
based on one of the express limitations listed in section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies.133 The Court of Appeal in the ~ellcome case mdicated that tf 
this exclusion could no longer be based on the meaning of the words 
"manner of new manufacture" then it might come within the closing 
words of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. That is allowing such 
patents might result in "raising prices of commodities at home" or be 
"generally mconvenient". Also m the Wellcome case the Court of Appeal 
stressed the ethical objections to such patents. By stressing the ethical 
considerations the Court of Appeal has moved a long way from the 
decision in C & W's Application in which the Solicitor-General expressly 
excluded such concerns from his mind. 
In Wel/come Cooke J cited with approval a passage from Kahn J, who, in 
discussing Israeli patent law, said that a basis for excluding medical 
treatment patents could be found in the Israeli equivalent to section 
17( I )(b ). It would seem that over the years there has been a change in the 
basis of the exclusion of medical treatment patents. A time might be 
approaching when it could be squarely based on section l 7(l)(b), such 
patents being contrary to morality. 
XVIII THE PROPOSED N}~W ZEALAND REFORMS 
Reform of New Zealand's patent legislation offers an opportunity to 
address the problems raised by biotechnology inventions with regard to 
moral issues Should New Zealand follow the l TS ("pure patentability") or 
233 See for example Fli l,,l{v & C'n. 1'i 4pplicatwn ahove n 100. 
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the European ("morally-responsible") approach?234 Will this opportunity 
be taken to address the issues at all? 
A Proposed reforms t,o the New Zea/,and Patents Act 
I Repeal, of the definiti.on of an inventi.on 
In 1992 the l\1Iinistry of Commerce produced some "proposed 
recommendations" on the reform of New Zealand's patent law.235 The 
Mnustry recommended that the current definition of an "invention" be 
repealed. This would remove the limitations currently imposed upon 
patentability by section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. Instead of having a 
defirutJ.on of "invention" patentability would be determined by the 
application of three criteria, namely. an invention would have to be new; 
involve an mventive step; and be industrially applicable. This course was 
favoured because the Ministry believed that it would represent a clear 
break from the overly restrictive old definition and would increase 
certainty with regard to what was required to obtain a patent. Also this 
simplification rrught result in lower costs for applicants, 236 and would be 
consistent with mtemational obligations. The Ministry propose that there 
should be no specific exceptions to patentability. Methods of medical 
treatment would be rendered patentable. 
The main reason for the proposal would seem to be to establish a more 
liberal patent regime in which new technologies were not excluded from 
patentability by the requirements of the current defmition of an invention. 
As the Ministry put it this new approach would be:237 
234 
235 
236 
237 
Above n 32. 
A hrn -,, n ")"') 
.cl..UVV\., 11 .L'-'. 
No empirical data was provided to support this speculative claim. 
Above n 22, 7. 
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A clear break from the present approach. Any possibility of bemg restricted by 
previous practice would be removed. This approach should also overcome 
recent difficulties which have arisen in respect of the extent to which new 
technologies are eligible for patent protection. 
The cryptic reference to "recent difficulties" is perhaps a reference to the 
Harvard Onco-mouse patent and other biotechnology inventions. These 
difficulties are to be "overcome" by a more permissive patent regime. The 
Ministry have decided that the patent regime should be more permissive 
without articulating the reasons for this policy stance, except in the 
broadest sense. The argument would appear to be that under the current 
regime some new technologies will, in some instances, be unpatentable, 
and that therefore patent laws should be liberalised to "overcome" this 
"difficulty". This is rather a shallow treatment of the issues involved. 
The present Act does not have a definition of what is an infringement of a 
patent. It is proposed that such a definition be included in any new Act. It 
has been suggested that this definition could contain some exclusions. For 
example while methods of medical treatment may be rendered patentable 
by the removal of the definition of an invention. the actual use in 
treatment of such a method would be excluded from the definition of 
infringement. 238 
In the Welicome case Cooke .T commented on the deep-seated sense that 
the art of the physician or the surgeon were outside the scope of 
patentabilitv.239 Somers J said that the treatment of human ailment was of 
a special character.240 The :rvtinistry of Commerce propose to "overcome" 
this "difficulty" by removing th definition of invention from tht.. Act and 
having no specific excepllons from patcntability, without apparently 
238 
l.39 
240 
Above n 22. 
Above n 112, 388. 
Above n 112, 404. 
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having undertaken the wide range of inquiries on the relative social and 
economic ments ot such a move which the Court of Appeal in Wellcome 
suggested was necessary. If methods of medical treatment are rendered 
patentable, then their use should be excluded from the definition of 
infringement. The better approach would be to specifically exclude 
methods of medical treatment from patentability in the first place. This 
would send clearer, and more certain, signals to those using methods of 
medical treatment. 
2 Repeal, of secti.on 17 
To implement the proposal that there should be no specific exceptions to 
patentability section 17 of the Patents Act 1953 would need to be 
repealed. This would assist in overcoming the difficulty that a 
biotechnology invention might fall foul of the "contrary to law or 
moralitv" provision contained in section 17(l)(b). 
3 Impact of the proposed reforms 
These proposed reforms would have little impact on current New Zealand 
practice in relation to DNA and transgenic animal patents. However, there 
would no longer be the option of declirung patent applications in these 
areas on the grounds that their use would be contrary to law or morality. 
There is also room for argument that current New Zealand practice is not 
what it should be with regard to the morality provision in section 
17(1 )(b ).241 
In relation to the repeal of section 17 the Ministry noted that "inventions 
contrary to law or morality can be controlled by the law against which the 
241 
For example the granting of the UpJohn application for a 
transgenic mouse to study hair growth in New Zealand when it 
was rejected on the grounds of morality in Europe. 
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invention is contrary ". 242 This view is open to challenge. 
First, this statement makes no attempt to address the long standing and 
widespread entrenchment in intellectual property law, including patent 
law, of exclusions based on illegality and immorality.243 The exdusion 
from patentability of inventions which are contrary law has existed 
continuously in England since at least 1623, and has always been a part of 
New Zealand law. The Patents Act 1977 (UK), the EPC and the proposed 
European draft Directive on Biotechnology all contain provisions relating 
to morality. A House of Lords Sub-Committee has recently expressed 
support for continuing to consider ethical considerations in patent law.244 
If New Zealand were now to change its position one would at least expect 
to find careful arguments in support of this change. The 1inistry of 
Commerce have not provided any such arguments. 
Secondly, as Davison CJ observed in the Wellcome case in the Supreme 
Court "[i]t would be absurd if by one law patents might be granted to 
reward persons for providing the means of violating any other law". 245 
Th.ts argument has the nng of common st:;nse about it. However, it might 
be argued that, as a matter of practicality, the patent office is not equipped 
to screen all applications for legality and adherence to certam ill defined 
moral principles. But if an invention is clearly illegal then does it make 
sense for the patent office to proceed with a patent application relating to 
it? One would intuitively think not. There is also the possibility that the 
only time that the illegality or immorality of an invention comes in for 
close official scrutiny is during the patent prosecution process. Perhaps 
242 
243 
244 
l4S 
Above n 22, 9. 
See Pa11s VIII and IX above. 
Above n 166. 
Above n 80, 332. 
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this opportunity to screen out illegal or immoral inventions should not be 
lost. 
Thirdly, the Ministry of Commerce's argument ignores the fact that there 
is a group of inventtons which occupy the middle ground. That is 
inventions which are not prohibited by law but on which it is not felt to be 
appropriate to grant proprietary rights.246 For example in Masterman's 
Design Aldous J did not consider the design in question to be illegal under 
any other Act or law, but he still considered that there might be grounds 
for "preventing the dtsigner from having the proprietary right given by the 
Act to protect lus work" _z47 For example 1t nught be considered 
appropriate to conduct germ-line gene therapy on humans while it would 
be immoral ( or contrary to human dignity) to grant proprietary rights in 
human beings, parts of human beings or modified parts of human beings. 
Al<;o in Masterman's Design the hearing officer considered that it would 
not be proper to give the imprimatur of registration to a design which was 
likely to off end the susceptibilities of a not insubstantial number of 
persons. although Aldous J disagreed with this suggest10n. 
Thus it can be argued that the illegality exclusion fulfils a function which 
cannot be performed by "the law against which the invention is 
contrary. "248 
246 
247 
248 
The same principle is demonstrated by the non-protection of 
copyright in immoral works. See Part VII B 1 above. 
Ah,_,,,,..., 64 11),1 
rl.UVV\.I 11 , .1. V"'"t". 
Se1., also Part IX above. 
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B The GA 1T (Uruguay Round) Bill 
The GA TT (Uruguay Round) Bill amends a number of Acts in order to 
give effect to New Zealand's obligations arising out of the Uruguay Round 
of GAl T Negotiations. Clause 3 ot the Bill repeals section 17 of the 
Patents Act 1953, and substitutes the following section: 
17 ( 1) If 1t appears to the Commissioner in the case of any application for a 
patent that the use of the invention in respect of which the applicat10n 1s made 
would be contrary to morality. the Commissioner may refuse the application. 
(2) An appeal to the Court shall lie from any dec1s1on of the Commissioner 
under th1s sechon. 
Thus the Ministry of Commerce's proposed recommendation to repeal 
section 17 is only to be partially fulfilled. The morality exclu.ciion is to 
remain2'19 and will provide a possible means for denying patent protection 
to some biotechnology inventions. If the present definition of an invention 
is repealed then the morality clause may provide a means by which patent 
protect10n could be denied to methods of medical treatment of human 
beings. 
C The Patents Bill 
It is expected that a further Bill reforming the Patents A.et 1953 will be 
introduced into Parliament in the next few years, possibly during 1995. 
The form of this Bill is of course unknown at the present time. fhe 
Ministry of Commerce's proposed recommendations in 1992 still perhaps 
provide a guide to the shape of future reforms. However, the retention of 
a morality provision in the G ATT (Uruguay Round) Bill, despite the 1992 
----- ---
249 It has been suggested that this change of heart was precipitated 
by representations made by Tt Puru Koktn, who sought to retain 
this exclusion as a possible means of protecting the intellectual 
property rights of Maori from appropriation. 
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recommendation that it be removed, illustrates that we will not know the 
content,;; of the Bill until it is actually introduced into Parliament. 
If the proposed recommendations are adhered to then the current 
definition of an invention will be repealed and will be replaced with three 
critena for patentability, namely novelty, inventive step and industrial 
applicability. There would be no specific exceptions to patentability, 
including methods of medical treatment. However, the use of a method of 
medical treatment may be excluded from the definition of infringement. 
'XIX SHOULD MORAL AND ETl-IlCAL VALUES BE A 
PART OF NEW ZEALAND'S PATENT LAW? 
A What Mora/, and Ethical, Valu.es are Involved? 
To talk about "morality" can sound outdated in modem society. The 
knee-jerk reaction is that it has no place in the law. However, with regard 
to morality provisions in patent laws this reaction is based on a 
misconception of their role. 1\forality provisions have a thoroughly modem 
role to play in patent law today. The importance of this modem role is 
increased as a result of the emergence of new technologies which have 
profound implications for our society. The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
defmes "moral" as:250 
concerned with goodness or badness of human character or behaviour, or with 
the distmctlon between nght and wrong ... concerned with accepted rules and 
standards of human behaviour .. conforrmng to accepted standards of general 
conduct. 
"Morality" is defmed as 'the degree of conformity of an idea, practice, 
etc., to moral principles. 11251 
250 
251 
Above n 1. 
Above n I 
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The use of the morality proVJ.Sion in the EPC in relat10n to the Harvard 
Onco-mouse illustrates the modem use of such provisions. The morality 
provision was used to weigh the benefits and disadvantages of a transgenic 
organism. The proVJ.Sion allowed consideration of issues such as animal 
suffering, risks to the environment and benefits to humans and animals. 
The morality and public policy provisions of the Common Position on the 
draft Directive also demonstrate the modern role of "morality" by: 
prohibiting patents on the human body or parts of the human body as 
such;252 by denying patent protection to forms of human gene therapy 
wluch are contrary to human dignity;253 and by introducing a balancing 
test to determine the patentability of non-human animal gene therapy.254 
The morality test here involves balancing the su:ff ering or physical 
handicaps caused to the animal against the benefits to humans and 
animals. These areas raise modem moral issues which need to be 
addressed.255 The issue is can they, or should they, be addressed by the 
patent system. 
B 1Yorality in Patent Law 
1 Morality provisions do not be/,ong in patent law? 
It is sometimes said that morality provisions simply do not belong as a part 
of patent law. They are somehow out of place in patent law, which is 
concerned only with the promotion of innovation. This assertion is not 
supported by the facts. It has been argued above that in fact morality is 
252 
253 
15-1 
255 
Article 2.3(a). 
Article 2.3(b ): arguably the concept of "human digruty" is already 
included bv the morality provision of existing patent laws, for 
examples l 7(l)(b) Patents Act 1953. 
Article 2.3(c) and Recital 15. 
The concern modem society has over new technologies is 
articulated in the reports discussed in Part VI above 
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incorporated into our general law, and is by no means an unusual feature 
of intellectual property Jaw.i56 For centuries morality provisions have been 
a part of patent law. Even the courts in the US, which have in recent years 
eschewed the use of morality arguments in patent law, once openly used 
such arguments. 257 The development of new technologies in the twentieth 
century has perhaps made the use of such morality exclusions more 
difficult, but it certainly has not rendered them less relevant. If anything 
new technologies have made the morality exclusion more necessary than 
ever before. 
As well as explicit morality proV1S1ons the patent system intrinsically 
embodies certam moral and ethical values. This ts reflected in section 6 of 
the Statute of Monopolies 1623 (UK). The section 6 limitations have 
allowed patent offices and courts to make value judgements on issues of 
social advantage before granting a patent. For example in deciding 
whether a patent would be "generally inconvenient" or "mischievous to the 
State". 
2 Morality provisions are too vague and subjective? 
Those opposed to the incorporation of moral values in patent law argue 
that morality is too subjective and vague a concept to include in patent 
laws. 258 Others believe that attempts to incorporate ideas of popular 
morality and ethics into patent law only cause confusion and legal 
uncertainty.259 There is some truth in the comment that morality may be 
subjective, and can be vague until patterns and precedents are established 
However, moral considerations are also important, and cannot be 
disregarded simply because they raises difficult issues. 
256 
257 
258 
259 
See Part VII above. 
Above n 75. 
For example see above n 32. 
Above n 158, 1 88. 
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The problems of vagueness and subjectivity can be overcome by setting 
out in an enactment what shall not be patentable on moral ground<;. For 
example, in the Common Position on the draft Directive Article 2.3(a) 
states that patents shall not be available on parts of the human body as 
such This provision is not vague and subjective, although is still requires 
interpreting. 
However, there is more room for vagueness subjectivity and consequent 
uncertainty when the patent office is given a discretion to decide whether 
somethmg is immoral. This problem can be addressed by adding 
gu1dehncs to an enactment which indicate which considerations can validly 
be taken mto account when assessmg morality. For example, in the 
Common Position Article 2.3( c) and Recital 15 set up a balancing test for 
assessing whether methods of non-human animal gene therapy are to be 
patentable.260 Factors to be weighed include the amount of suffering 
caused to the arumal, the objective of the invention, the benefits to 
humans, and the benefits to arumals. Such a test does leave room for 
subJecttvity and uncertainty to some degree, but the problem is not 
insurmountable. As cases are settled a clearer idea of what is, and what is 
not, permitted will emerge. 261 
3 Reguluti.on is best achieved by specific laws 
It is also argued that those activities upon which the morality exclusion 
impinges are best regulated by laws concerned directly with that activity. 262 
This argument 1s deficient m a number ot respects. First, it seems entirely 
appropriate to confront the moral issue raised by new technologies in the 
system which exists for the reason of encouraging the development of new 
l60 
261 
262 
See Part XIII B l and 3 above. 
This process 1s already undcrway in Europe with the Haivard 
Onco· mous" and Upjohn cases: see Part XII above . 
Above n 22. 
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technologies ie the patent system. Secondly, while it is not possible to 
protect animal welfare or human dignity solely through the operation of 
the patent system, that does not mean that the patent system cannot play a 
useful role in a wider system of regulation. For example the patent system 
can work in conjunction with other laws designed to discourage socially 
undesirable activities. Thirdly, concerns directed towards the granting of 
property nghts in particular subject matter, parts of the human body for 
example, are in fact most appropriately dealt with by the svstem which 
grants such rights, ie the patent system. 
The use of moral considerations in the patent system can be used to 
promote or discourage activities which are not contrary to any other law. 
For example the denial of patents on methods of medical treatment can be 
used to promote the unhindered use and access to such methods. A 
property right is denied to encourage the unhindered use of technology. 
In contrast, the denial of patents on forms of gene therapy considered to 
be contrary to human dignity, can be used to discourage such research 
from being pursued in the first place. A property nght is denied to 
discourage the research, and also to make a statement about society's 
values. These diverse goals are naturally ones which can be pursued 
through the patent system since they relate to property rights. 
To argue that those activities at which the morality exclusion hits are best 
regulated by laws concerned directly with that activity is to miss the point 
that the patent system has its own unique l;ontribution to make to a 
broader regulatory framework. 
What path do rekvant reports suggest? 
The principles enunciated by the Canadian Royal Commission on New 
Reproductive Technologies, "Proceed With Care", and the New Zealand 
Department of Justice Report, "Assisted Human Reproduction, 
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Navigating Our Future",263 would appear to support the retention of 
ethical va]ues m patent law. The ethic of care and the concept of human 
dignity suggest that human tissues should not be made a commodity 
through the granting of property right~ over them in the form of patents. 
The Canadian report expressly supported the continued exclusion of 
methods of medical treatment from patentability.264 The New Zealand 
report was of the view that there should be no commercialisation of the 
use of human tissue.265 Granting patents over human tissue is a form of 
commercialisation, and may conflict with human dignity. 
5 The patent office is not the proper forum for morality decisions 
It is :frequently said that the patent office is not the place for ethical 
decisions. 266 The patent office is fundamentally structured to promote 
technology and not to assess it. 
Howev r, morality has long been within the jurisdiction of the patent 
office. Jn answer to the suggestion that patent offices are not equipped to 
make moral judgements a distinction can be drawn between absolute and 
selective moral prohibitions. For example if all methods of medical 
treatment of human beings are excluded from patentability on ethical 
grounds, then it is easy for the patent office to app]y this test. No one 
could complain that this involved the mere subjective opinions of patent 
examiners. An absolute rule like this can be set by the legislature in an 
enactment, or by the courts when interpreting a legislative provision.
267 
263 
264 
265 
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See Part VI above. 
Above n 38, 721. 
Above n 46, 29. 
Above n 219. 
Examples of absolute prohibitions on moral grounds are Articles 
2.'3(a) and (b) of the Common Position on the draft Directive. 
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The problem is greater when the patent office has to exercise a discretion 
in each individual case. In Europe the !:'..PO Legal Department has 
acknowledged that in exercising the morality exclusion under the EPC it 
will be necessary for individual e. ·aminers to decide the morality issue for 
thcmselvt:s, initially. t ka~t, on the facts of each case.268 This problem can 
be alleviated by the formulation of guidelines as to which considerations 
are relevant to the morality question. Such guidelines could be 
mcorporated into an enactment. Th.LS approach is bcmg tollowed by the 
European Common Position on the draft Directive with regard to Article 
2.3(c). 
There is no reason why the patent office should not have or develop the 
competence to make moral judgements in relation to patent applications, 
particularly if suitable guidelines are produced. The discretion should be 
exercised judicially on reasonable grounds which are capable of being 
clearlv stated. A test similar to that adopted bv the EPO might be 
considered. Another possibility is that the patent office could form a 
committee to screen questionable applications for compliance with a 
morality provision, similar to the ethics committees which screen 
applications to conduct medical research. 
6 The U.S. approach is to be preferred 
Bennett has suggested, in the context of the transgenic animal debate, that 
although the EPO position docs have "emotional appcal",269 morality is too 
vague and subjective a term to be a legal benchmark, and the patent office 
is not equipped to fulfil this function. Consequently the US approach is 
"the correct and practical one". 
268 
269 
Above n 11. 
Above n 32. 
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The arguments as to vagueness and subjectivity have been discussed 
above. The suggestion that all the l<.,uropean approach ha.~ going for it is 
emotional appeal cannot be sustained. The European approach recogruses 
that the patent system docs have a role to play with regard to the morality 
of new technologies, and attempts to address the issue. The European 
approach r1,;wgruses that the patent system does not exist in a vacuum, 
anct <.an b<. US(,,;d to m1lut.nu, the achievement of wider social goals. 
B Cu/Jura/_ Issues and Access to and Ownership of Geneti.c 
Resources 
The claims of indigenous peoples to genetic resources can perhaps be 
charactensed as having a moral element. Governments not bound by law 
to respect such interests may at least have a moral obligation to do so. The 
use of genetic resources in biotechnology mventions may be seen as being 
contrary to this moral obligation. 
In New Zealand the possible implications of the Treaty of Waitangi must 
be borne in mind. In a claim currently before the Waitangi Tribunal the 
claimants state that·270 , 
Crown pohc1es on patentmg and the passage of the I Q87 Plant Variety Rights 
Act have demed Maori those proprietary interests m mdigenous flora wluch are 
inherent m the exercise of te tmo rangahratanga 
The claimants seek control of indigenous flora and fauna in a manner 
which recognises te tino rangatiratanga o te Iwi Maori. 1he morality 
170 Claim Wai 262 "A claim by Haana Murray (Ngati Kuri) and Dell 
Wihongi (Te Rarawa) and others relating to the Protection, 
Control, Conservation, Management, Treatment, Propagation, 
Sale, Dispersal, Utilisation, and Restriction on the use of and 
transnuss10n of the knowledge ot New Zealand Indigenous Flora 
and Fauna and the genetic resource contained therein." Statement 
of Claim p 7 
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provision in New Zealand patent law may provide a means by which 
patents could be denied on inventions, the use of which was considered to 
be contrary to the moral rights of Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi. 
C Genes and DNA 
On what basis can moral objections be raised against patents on human 
genes? Some people see no rational basis for finding ethical concerns in 
the issue of patenting human genes, 271 while to others they are 
self-evident. First, it can be argued that the ownership and 
commodification of human genes 1s contrary to human dignity. This 
position seems to follow from the arguments made by Atkin and Reid, 272 
who state that all human tissue has mana. Secondly, it can be argued that 
allowing patents on human genes will slow down medical research by 
inhibiting the free exchange and use of research results. These two themes 
can be discerned in the arguments put forward by those opposed to 
patents on human genes. 
In the UK four professional organisations representing clinical geneticists 
have asked for the prohibition of patents on human genes. m The Clinical 
Genetics Society, the Clinical Molecular Genetics Society, the Association 
of Clinical Cytogeneticists and the Genetics Nurses and Social Workers 
Association oppose the patenting of human genes on two grounds. The 
first ground is that it is morally unacceptable to patent an entity found in a 
natural state m the human body. The second ground relates to the free 
exchange of research results. It is claimed that the ability to patent human 
genes has already made researchers reluctant to release research results 
and share inf onnation until the patent is secure. The concern is that this 
271 
172 
273 
Above n 181. 
Above n 46. 
D Dickson "UK clinical geneticists ask for ban on the patenting of 
human genes" (1993) 366 Nature 391 
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reluctance to share information will slow down the progress of research 
into the causes and treatment of human genetic diseases.274 
Charities that are m~jor supporters of medical research in the UK arc also 
campaigning against the patenting of human genes. 1he Genetic Interest 
Group (GIG) in the UK represent~ nearly 100 voluntary groups involved 
with genetic disorders. The GIG have moral and ethical objections to 
patents being granted over genes because genes arc a basic part of the 
human body. The GIG are concerned that such patents will slow down 
genetic research, and are not in the best interests of those suffering from 
genetic conditions. 
There has been talk of an international agreement not to patent human 
genes. m Britain's MRC suggested the possibility during the dispute with 
the NIH over EST patents.276 lfowever. no such agreement appears close. 
In France the Minister for Research, Hubert Curien, hali described patents 
on the human genome as "ethically unacceptable".277 Three Bills 
concerned wtth bioethics have been discussed in the French Senate. The 
first of these Bills is airn.ed at protecting "human dignity and the human 
race". 278 It proposes a ban on patenting parts of the human body, including 
the human genome. The Bill proposes banning germ-line gene therapy, 
but not somatic cell gene therapy. 
274 
275 
276 
277 
2'.'!I 
For example researchers at the Children's Hospital in Toronto 
were the first to identify the main genetic mutation for cystic 
fibrosis. They have demanded royaltv agreements from British 
researchers developing cystic fibrosis screerung kits. 
Above n 273 
Above n 186. 
Above n 186. 
D Butler "How France plans to legislate for bioethics" (1994) 367 
Nature 209 
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D Tra11sgenic Animals 
Why might transgenic animal patents be objected to on moral grounds? 
And can these objections be appropriately addressed by the patent system, 
or shouJd they really be addressed by other forms of regulation? 
The Guidelines to the EPC state that a fair test to apply to detennine 
whether an invention is contrary to morality is to consider "whether it is 
probable that the general public would regard the invention as so 
abhorrent that the grant of patent nghts would be inconceivable". I'his 
formulation suggests that if an invention is considered to be sufficiently 
abhorrent it is immoral, and a patent will not be granted. However, in 
practice the EPO apply a balancing test, in which whether an invention is 
immoral or not is measured by weighing up the positive and negative 
aspects of the invention. Morality is thus a utilitanan concept based on the 
overall good. If one accepts that a balancmg test ts to be used then what 
criteria are to be considered as tending towards immorality? 
The abhorrence of the genera] public is apparently the touchstone of 
morality for the EPO. The EPO consider animal suffering and the risk to 
the environment to be relevant. Public abhorrence could also include 
concern about destroying "species integrity", the creation of animal/human 
hybrids and a devaluation of life. 
It has been argued that patents should not be granted on living organisms 
since this is not what patent law was designed to cover. rn J.\.fost patent 
laws were written before the advent of modem biotechnology and did not 
have such technology in mind. This view is supported by the type of 
language used in the defmition of an mvention in the Patents Act 1953. 
13 Belcher, G Ilawtin A Patent on Life Ownership of Plant and 
Animal Research (IDRC, Ottawa, 1991 ), 17. 
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Describing a mouse as a "manufacture" does not seem to be quite correct. 
The system was designed for the mouse trap and not the mouse. 
However, the courts have rejected arguments of this nature.280 It is 
inherent in the concept of a patent system for inventions that the nature of 
future invention<s will not be known at the present time. 
Multinational corporations with a stake in biotechnology, working through 
the International Chamber of Commerce, have sought widespread 
recognition of the patentability of living matter.281 They claim that the 
UPOV Convention provides inadequate protec1:ton. Reports by WIPO 
have supported this view.282 
Malcolm Eames, Head of Information and Research, for the British Union 
for the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV) says that "[alnimal patents will 
provide a massive financial incentive to find new ways of exploiting 
animals. This will inevitably lead to more arumal expenments and 
increasingly unnatural and inhumane treatment of farm animals". 283 
Possible envrronmental and health implications of releasing genetically 
modified organisms into the environment are difficult to predict and 
should also be considercd.284 The BUAV is concerned about the 
281 
282 
283 
284 
For example the United States Supreme Court rejec,ted arguments 
of this nature in Diamondv Chakrabarty above n 190. 
United Nations Environment Programme, ad hoe Working C'JToup 
of Experts on Biological Diversity "Relationship Bet\Veen 
Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Genetic 
Resources and Biotechnology" UNEP/Bio.Div.3/Inf4 18 June 
1990. 
l\bovc n 282, 6. 
"Three Nice Mice: P1P Issues More Animal Patents" (1993) 2(1) 
Biotechnology.Law Report, 4,6. 
United Nations Environment Programme "Biotechnology: 
Concepts and Issues for Consideratton in Preparation of a 
Framework Legal Instrument for the Conservation of 
Biological Diversity" UNEP/Bio Div.317, 23 May 1990. 
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possibility of an escaped transgenic animal interbreeding with wild animals 
and spreading a gene with unwanted effects, causing cancer for example. 
The accidental escape of genetically engineered organisms has already 
occurred in New .lealand285 and the US. 286 Tlus is perhaps an argument 
against genetic engineering per se, rather than against patents on the 
products ot b10technology. Biotechnology has been invented and it cannot 
no\\' be uninvented. The refusal to grant patents on life forms would not 
stop the use of biotechnology. 
It has also been argued that the creation of transgenic organisms is an 
unacceptable interference with species integrity.287 This interference is 
wrong and species should not be crossed. Species have a right to have 
their genetic composition left alone. Animal patents are simply the latest 
invasion of animals inherent rights. 288 Religious arguments suggest that 
people ::,hould not tamper with God's creations. Swapping genes about 
between species IS morally offensive. 
E Methods of Treatment 
Arguments concerning the patentability of methods of medical treatment 
can be pitched at a number of levels. It is possible to argue that some 
forms of medical treatment (some types of gene therapy for example) are 
contrary to human dignity and should be excluded from patent protection 
for that reason. Such procedures should not be patentable at all. Because 
the method itself is considered to be undesirable for some reason it is 
denied patent protection. 
285 
286 
287 
288 
Y Cripps "Genetic Engineering - A Problem for the Patent 
Office?" f1979] NZLJ 232. 
Above n 35. 
Above n 75. 
For a discussion of the growing recognition of animal rights see: S 
1 Goodkin "The Evolution of Animal Rights" (1987) 18:2 
Columbia Human Rights I ,aw Review 261. 
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On another level, most methods of medical treatment are considered to be 
a(.;.ceptable, and the question is should they also be patentable. Separate 
ethical arguments can be raised as to why these method should not be 
patented. 
1 Arguments/or the exclusion of methods of treatment 
considered to be co11trary to huma11 di,g,zity 
The emergence of gene therapy strengthens the argument for the 
exclusion of some methods of medical treatment from patentability 
because it introduces an area of medical treatment with immense potential 
for abuse, and the undennining of human values. France has included 
germ-line gene therapy as a procedure prohibited in a Bill directed at 
protecting "human dignity and the human race". In Europe the draft 
Directive on Biotechnology looks likely to include an Article prohibiting 
patents on gene therapy mventlons the use of which would be contrary to 
human dignity. A European patent application has already been fiJed for a 
method of human germ-line gene therapy. 289 The Director of the EPO in 
Munich, Christian Gugerell, has described this application as the first of its 
kind in Europe and possibly the world. Gugerell is reported as having said 
that the EPO would have to decide whether this patent was ethical and 
that his first reaction was that "it would be highly doubtful whether 
something like this could be patented". 
While the patent system alone cannot be expected to regulate the area of 
gene therapy it can play a role. It can deny the incentives provided by 
patents where the method is considered to be undesirable, or where the 
granting of property rights in the method is considered to be contrary to 
human dignity. Denial of patent protection would seem to be entirely 
appropriate in some circumstances. If a method was particularly abh01rent 
289 Above n 18. 
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then one would expect to find it prohibited by specific laws. l Iowever, this 
does not mean that the patent system does not have a role to play in the 
overall system of regulatJ.on. 
2 Arguments for the exdu~ion of otherwrse acceptahk 
methods of treatment .from patentahility 
Then; are ethical arguments against granting patents on methods of 
medical treatment, where the method itself is not regarded to be 
obJecttonable m anywav. 290 Granting patents for methods of treatment 
allows the monopolisat10n of the treatment method at the expense of 
patients. When a drug or medical device is patented there will usually be 
an adequate alternative drug or device which can be substituted for the 
patented item. However, in the case of a method of treatment it is more 
likely that there will be no alternative, and the method will be completely 
unavailable to some patients. Probably those who cannot afford it. Under 
most health systems all patients do not have access to all new technologies. 
However, this does not make it desirable to introduce new barriers to 
access unless the benefits of allowing method of treatment patents are 
clear. 
Relatively few pure 291 method of treatment patents have been granted in 
the US. Those wluch have been granted have mostly been for non-routine 
procedures, and not for basic medical pro<.,edures. The full scope ol the 
potential problems created by method of treatment patents may not yet 
have been realised in the US. The problems would be more pronounced 
should patents be obtained over basic general medical procedures. 
290 
291 
Above n 283. 
By "pure" is meant processes unrelated to a new drug or medical 
device. 
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Granting patents on methods of treatment could lead to physicians having 
a conflict of interests. This conflict could be manifested in the manner and 
timing of the disclosure of research results. Results may not be released 
until patent rights arc secure. Also the prospect of financial reward from 
licensing a patented method may be reflected by a bias in the reporting of 
research results. The better the method sounds the more physicians will 
want to obtain a licence to use it, and the greater the rewards for the 
inventor. Also. if a doctor has paid a licence foe to use a method they may 
want to use it as frequently as possible to maximise their return on the 
licence fee. Although other mechanisms function to regulate the medical 
profession, these are still unwelcome influences. 
Also such patents may interfere with the physicians autonomy and the 
confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship. Physicians will not be 
able to use patented methods unless they obtain a licence. The patentee 
will have to pry into physician-patient relationships lo ddect possible 
infnngers. 
Patents for methods of treatment in relation to reproduction raise 
constitutional issues in the US. Ihe ~oru;titutional protection afforded to 
the privacy surrounding reproduction would make the monitonng of 
possible infringement difficult. Such patents may also raise privacy issues 
in New Zealand. 
3 Cost Benefit Analysis 
The c..ourts have said that the width of analysis reqwred to determine 
whether patent'> on methods of medical treatment should be allowed was 
more than they could accomplish, and was a job for Parliament with its 
greater resources. 292 
---------
191 Above n lJ 2, 391. 
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No empirical study appears to have been done on the benefits of method 
of medical treatment patents. In theory such patents should act as an 
incentive to the development of new methods of treatment. As a result of 
the patent mcentive new medical advances would be made, which would 
not otherwise have been made. However, methods of treatment that 
would have been developed anyway, without the patent incentive, would 
also be rendered patentable. This is an extra cost which must be 
outweighed, m addit10n to the ethical costs related to the physician-patient 
relationship, before society achieves a net gain from allowing method of 
treatment patents. Physician autonomy and physician-patient 
confidentiality arc not absolute values, rather they are a means to achieve 
high quality health care. If the benefits of patents on melhods of treatment 
were sufficient then the ethical concerns could be outweighed. 
However, the alleged benefits of allowing method of treatment patents are 
only theoretical. New Lealand and the UK have always excluded methods 
of treatment from patentabilitv. Significant medical advances have 
continued to be made in these countries in the absence of such patents. 
\\Thi.le such methods ha ·e long been patentable in the US, it is not 
suggested that more advanced methods of treatment have emerged in the 
US because of the patentability issue. 293 
In the absence of any empirical evidence that method of treatment patents 
offer society a net gain, it is argued here that such patents should not be 
permitted in New Zealand. The advantages of such patents are only 
theoretical, and even then it is not clear that they outweigh the costs. 
293 
-- - ----
A possible exception to this is the Surrogate Embryo Transfer 
(SET) technique which was developed in the US with private 
funds and has been patented. see above n 220. 
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4 1lfandatory Universal. Licenlilig as a Soluti.on to Ethical, 
Problems 
Compulsory licensing is one way in which the potential problems posed by 
method of treatment patents could be restricted. 294 If a physician knew 
that the licence application procedure wac; simple, relatively cheap and that 
a licence would not be refused, then many of the ethical problems posed 
by such patents could be ameliorated. However, this may reduce the costs 
of allowing such patents it does not remove them. 
5 The New Zea/and positi.on 
After the Wellcome case on what was the New Zealand exclusion of 
methods of medical treatment based? It could be based on such methods 
not coming within the words "manner of new manufacture" or on the 
limitations contained within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies. The 
Court of Appeal based considerable weight on ethical considerations 
concerning tht., art of the physiuan. Arguably, tf tht defirution of an 
invention were removed from the Patents Act, then methods of medical 
treatment could still be excluded under the morality provision retained in 
the proposed new section 17 of the Patents et 1953 to be enacted by the 
GATT (Uruguay Round) Bill. 
6 Compromi.se posili,ons 
If the decision were made to allow method of treatment patents then there 
are many intermediate positions in between New Zealand's current 
position and a blanket allowance of such patents. For example: the 
definition of infringement could exdude the use of a method of treatment; 
the duration of patent protection could be reduced for such methods; the 
294 Above n 220. 
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experimental use defence could be enlarged to give other researchers 
greater freedom of action to use the patented method; Swiss-type and/or 
use-bound substance claims could be allowed instead of allowing patents 
on methods of medical treatment; a regime of compulsory universal 
licensing with pricing limitations could be introduced for methods of 
treatment patents; and there could be specific requirements as to the 
working of the method m New Zealand. It is argued here that the benefits 
of allowmg method of treatment patents are not sufficiently certam to 
justify changing their present exclus10n. However, if the position must be 
changed then a compromise position should be considered to limit the 
costs to society of allowing such patents. 
XX CONCLUSIONS 
A Moral, Arguments Do Have u Legllimate Role in Patent Laws 
:Moral and ethical arguments do have a legitimate role to play in modern 
patent laws. They can be used to achieve a number of diverse goals. The 
patent system does not exist in a vacuum and cannot be allowed to ignore 
moral values. The approach of the European Union is to be preferred over 
that of the US. The European approach may be more challenging (some 
might sa) less practicable) than the US approach, but developments in 
Europe suggest that it can be workable, and it does refuse to allow the 
encouragement of innovation to become an end in itself. It refuses to 
allow the patent system to exist in a moral vacuum, and refuses to allow 
human values to be swamped by new technology. 
B The F unctum of Moral Arguments 
Moral arguments can be used to achieve different objectives within the 
patent system. For example they can be used to promote features of 
society which are considered to he of value, such as physician autonomy, 
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or to deny an incentive to innovation in areas considered to be 
undesirable, such as those which result in animal suffering. Patent laws 
cannot achieve these goals alone, but they can make a useful contribution 
to a wider regulatory framework 
In areas where the moral concern is directed towards the existence of 
property rights in particular subject matter, then the patent system has a 
major role to pla) For example if it is considered to be contrary to human 
dignity to grant property rights in the human body, then this objective can 
partially be achieved through the patent system. 
C Mora/, Arguments and Methods of Medi.cm Treatment 
The exclusion of methods of medical treatment from patentability has a 
long history. The basis of this exclusion is largely ethical. Many countries, 
including New Zealand, maintain this e ·clusion today. 
'lhe New Zealand Court of Appeal in the Wellcome case resisted the 
temptation to allow patents on methods of medical treatment, preforring to 
leave such a change to Parliament. Before the law is changed to allow 
patents on methods of medical treatment some clear evidence, or at least 
some strong arguments, must be produced to show that the benefits of the 
change outweigh the costs. Neither the evidence or the arguments have yet 
been produced by the Ministry of Commerce to Justrfy the change. lbe 
advent of gene therapy has added a new dimension to the debate, and 
tends to support the exclusion of at least some methods of medical 
treatment from patentability. 
The exclusion of gene therapy could be based on the same grounds as 
other methods of medical treatment. Arguably, it could also be based on a 
general morality provision or on a provision relating to the dignity o1 the 
human race. 
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If methods of medical treatment are to be patentable then a system of 
mandatory universal licensing should be considered to help overcome 
some of the ethical problems that such patents create. Alternatively, the 
use of a method of medical treatment should be excluded from the 
definition of infringement in any new Patents Act. 
D Transgenic Animals 
Ihe patent system cannot play the primary role in the protection of animal 
welfare. However, it can play a useful role as a part of the wider 
regulatory system. A morality clause also allows other factors to be taken 
into account during the patent prosecution process, environmental issues 
for example. 
Transgenic animals which incorporate human genetic matenal raise issues 
that other transgenic animals do not. These animal/human hybrids raise 
issues which have been categorised as relating to human dignity, and the 
commercialisation and commodification of human tissue. Ultimately, they 
also raise issues related to slavery. These are alt valid concerns and there is 
no reason why these concerns should not be allowed to influence the 
patent system. 
It is appropriate that the morality provision is to be retained by the GATT 
(Uruguay Round) Bill. The current process of reform of the Patents Act 
1953 should be used to incorporate a provision which requires the patent 
office to exercise its discretion to decline transgenic animal patent 
applications if they fail the morality test. The adoption of a test of morality 
for transgenic arumals similar to that contained in the EPC Guidelines 
should be considered. 295 
295 See Part II B above. 
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E Human DNA and Genes 
Patents should not be permitted on human DNA and genes when found in 
the human body. This appears to be the present position in New 
Zealand. 296 Patent~ on human genes may also be denied following the 
application of the standard cntena for patentability, that is novelty, 
in ustrial applicability and inventive step. 
On one view, human DNA isolated from the body is simply a chemical 
molecule. Once the sequence has been isolated from the human body it 
will usually be synthesised artificially. It clearly has particular human 
significance, but this alone does not seem to be sufficient to deny patent 
protection. Allowing such patents does provide an incentive to 
biotechnology and drug companies to identify, isolate and purify usefuJ 
genes and DNA sequence, and develop these potentially valuable products 
for the market. The cost of this procedure can be high, and society will 
benefit from the new medicines which may be produced. The downside 
ethical costs of allowing such patents are not as clear as they are with 
transgenic animal and method of treatment patents. Allowing such patents 
on isolated human DNA or genes may not violate the ethic of care and 
human digrutv principles. An artificially svnthesised DNA molecule is not 
a part of the human body, it is merely another chemical molecule and its 
commercialisation is not contrary to human dignity. 
Isolated human DNA or genes will usually be inserted into some other 
organism (ranging from a bacterium to a cow) in order to be expressed. 
That expression system may be a transgenic animal which should be 
SUQject to a morality test before it is patentable. 
296 Above n 230. 
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